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ABSTRACT
Vaidya, Jaideep Shrikant. Ph.D., Purdue University, August, 2004. Privacy Pre-
serving Data Mining over Vertically Partitioned Data. Major Professor: Chris
Clifton.
The goal of data mining is to extract or \mine" knowledge from large amounts
of data. However, data is often collected by several dierent sites. Privacy, legal and
commercial concerns restrict centralized access to this data. Theoretical results from
the area of secure multiparty computation in cryptography prove that assuming the
existence of trapdoor permutations, one may provide secure protocols for any two-
party computation as well as for any multiparty computation with honest majority.
However, the general methods are far too inecient and impractical for computing
complex functions on inputs consisting of large sets of data. What remains open is
to come up with a set of techniques to achieve this eciently within a quantiable
security framework. The distributed data model considered is the heterogeneous
database scenario with dierent features of the same set of data being collected by
dierent sites. This thesis argues that it is indeed possible to have ecient and
practical techniques for useful privacy-preserving mining of knowledge from large
amounts of data. The dissertation presents several privacy preserving data mining
algorithms operating over vertically partitioned data. The set of underlying tech-
niques solving independent sub-problems are also presented. Together, these enable
the secure \mining" of knowledge.1
1 INTRODUCTION
It is possible to eciently extract or \mine" knowledge from large amounts of verti-
cally partitioned data within quantiable security restrictions. Knowledge Discovery
in Databases (KDD) is the term used to denote the process of extracting knowledge
from large quantities of data. The KDD process assumes that all the data is eas-
ily accessible at a central location or through centralized access mechanisms such
as federated databases and virtual warehouses. Moreover, advances in information
technology and the ubiquity of networked computers have made personal informa-
tion much more available. Privacy advocates have been challenging attempts to
bring more and more information into integrated collections. Attempts to combine
data have even resulted in public protest, witness Japan's creation of a national
registry containing information previously held by the prefectures [87]. Data min-
ing in particular has come under siege, such as the introduction of U.S. Senate Bill
188, the \Data-Mining Moratorium Act of 2003" [35]. While aimed specically at
the Total Information Awareness program [88], the bill as introduced would forbid
data-mining (including research and development) by the entire U.S. Department of
Defense, except for searches of public information or searches based on particular
suspicion of an individual. In addition, all U.S. government agencies would be re-
quired to report to congress on how their data-mining activities protect individual
privacy.
The irony is that data mining results rarely violate privacy. The objective of
data mining is to generalize across populations, rather than reveal information about
individuals. The hitch is that data mining works by evaluating individual data that
is subject to privacy concerns. Thus, the true problem is not data mining, but the
way data mining is done.2
However, the concern among privacy advocates is well founded, as bringing data
together to support data mining makes misuse easier. Much of this information has
already been collected, however it is held by various organizations. Separation of
control and individual safeguards prevent correlation of this information, providing
acceptable privacy in practice. However, this separation also makes it dicult to use
the information for purposes that would benet society, such as identifying criminal
activity. Proposals to share information across agencies, most recently to combat
terrorism, would eliminate the safeguards imposed by separation of the information.
Imagine the following scenario. A law enforcement agency wants to cluster in-
dividuals based on their nancial transactions, and study the dierences between
the clusters and known money laundering operations. Knowing the dierences and
similarities between normal individuals and known money launderers would enable
better direction of investigations. Currently, an individual's nancial transactions
may be divided between banks, credit card companies, tax collection agencies, etc.
Each of these (presumably) has eective controls governing release of the informa-
tion. These controls are not perfect, but violating them (either technologically or
through insider misuse) reveals only a subset of an individual's nancial records.
The law enforcement agency could promise to provide eective controls, but now
overcoming them gives access to an individual's entire nancial history. This raises
justiable concerns among privacy advocates.
Similarly, application of data mining in other domains is also increasing. Recent
emphasis on bioinformatics and in the medical domain try to leverage the power of
data mining in nding interesting patterns, disease causes, eectiveness of drugs and
so on. In the healthcare domain, especially with patient databases, legal issues are
prominent obstacles in jointly utilizing information.
Privacy and data mining can coexist. The problem with the above scenario is not
the data mining results, but how they are obtained. If the results could be obtained
without sharing information between the data sources, and the results were truly
summary and could not be used to deduce private information, there would be no3
loss of privacy through data mining. While obtaining globally meaningful results
without sharing information may seem impossible, it can be done.
The goal of this dissertation is to develop and evaluate new algorithms to e-
ciently solve several types of distributed computations over large data sets in a secure
manner.
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the state of the art in privacy, security and
data mining. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 constitute the main work in the thesis. Chapter
3 describes the solutions developed for some of the major data mining problems.
Chapter 4 presents solutions for the underlying secure primitives used in the work
of the prior chapter. The essential focus of this thesis/dissertation? has been to
propose ecient solutions for several data mining problems and to prove them secure.
Chapter 5 serves to experimentally validate the claims of eciency as well as to place
them in context. Chapter 6 summarizes the thesis.
Apart from original work, several protocols developed by others are also used in
support of the work here. The Appendix provides a brief listing of these protocols
for completeness.4
2 STATE OF THE ART IN PRIVACY, SECURITY AND DATA MINING
This chapter provides the background material required to give an appropriate per-
spective for the work done in this thesis. The chapter begins with a short summa-
rization of prevalent data mining algorithms. Section 2.2 covers the state of the art
in distributed data mining and also gives some detail on the dierent data partition-
ing models. Section 2.3 provides an overview of Secure Multiparty Computation,
the theoretical framework we use for proof of security. The nal section presents the
contemporary work done within Privacy Preserving Data Mining.
2.1 State of the Art in Data Mining Techniques
Data Mining is the analysis of (often large) observational data sets to nd un-
suspected relationships and to summarize the data in novel ways that are both
understandable and useful to the owner [44]. There are many dierent data mining
functionalities. A brief denition of each of these functionalities is now presented.
The denitions are directly collated from [43]. Data characterization is the sum-
marization of the general characteristics or features of a target class of data. Data
Discrimination, on the other hand, is a comparison of the general features of target
class data objects with the general features of objects from one or a set of contrasting
classes. Association analysis is the discovery of association rules showing attribute-
value conditions that occur frequently together in a given set of data. Classication
is the process of nding a set of models (or functions) that describe and distinguish
data classes or concepts, for the purpose of being able to use the model to predict the
class of objects whose class label is unknown. The derived model can be represented
in various forms, such as classication rules, decision trees, mathematical formulae,
or neural networks. Unlike classication and prediction, which analyze class-labeled5
data objects, clustering analyzes data objects without consulting a known class label.
Outlier Analysis attempts to nd outliers or anomalies in data. A detailed discus-
sion of these various functionalities can be found in [43]. Even an overview of the
representative algorithms developed for knowledge discovery is beyond the scope of
this dissertation. The interested person is directed to the many books which amply
cover this in detail [29,43,44].
2.2 Distributed Data Mining
In contrast to the centralized model, the Distributed Data Mining (DDM) model
assumes that the data sources are distributed across multiple sites. Algorithms
developed within this eld address the problem of eciently getting the mining
results from all the data across these distributed sources. Since the primary (if not
only) focus is on eciency, most of the algorithms developed to date do not take
security consideration into account. However, they are still useful in framing the
context of the thesis.
A simple approach to data mining over multiple sources that will not share data
is to run existing data mining tools at each site independently and combine the
results [17,18,75]. However, this will often fail to give globally valid results. Issues
that cause a disparity between local and global results include:
 Values for a single entity may be split across sources. Data mining at individual
sites will be unable to detect cross-site correlations.
 The same item may be duplicated at dierent sites, and will be over-weighted
in the results.
 Data at a single site is likely to be from a homogeneous population. Important
geographic or demographic distinctions between that population and others
cannot be seen on a single site.6
Cheung et al. proposed a method for horizontally partitioned data [21]. Dis-
tributed classication has also been addressed. A meta-learning approach has been
developed that uses classiers trained at dierent sites to develop a global classi-
er [17,18,75]. This could protect the individual entities, but it remains to be shown
that the individual classiers do not disclose private information. Recent work has
addressed classication using Bayesian Networks in vertically partitioned data [20],
and situations where the distribution is itself interesting with respect to what is
learned [90]. Shenoy et al. [85] propose an ecient algorithm for vertically mining
association rules.
Data mining algorithms that partition the data into subsets have been developed
[82]. Although the goal of parallelizing data mining algorithms is performance, the
communication cost between nodes is an issue. Parallel data mining algorithms may
also serve as a starting point [51,93]. However, none of this work directly addresses
privacy concerns.
With distributed data, the way the data is distributed also plays an important
role in dening the problem. Data could be partitioned into many parts either
vertically or horizontally.
2.2.1 Vertical Partitioning
Vertical partitioning (a.k.a. heterogeneous distribution) of data implies that
though dierent sites gather information about the same set of entities, they collect
dierent feature sets. For example, nancial transaction information is collected by
banks, while the IRS collects tax information for everyone. An illustrative example
of vertical partitioning and the kind of useful knowledge we can hope to extract is
given in Figure 2.1. The gure describes two databases, one contains medical records
of people while another contains cell phone information for the same set of people.
Mining the joint global database might reveal information like \Cell phones with
Li/Ion batteries lead to brain tumors in diabetics."7
Medical Records
Diabetic No Tumor PTR
Non-Diabetic No Tumor CAC
Diabetic Brain Tumor RPJ
Cell Phone Data
NiCd 3650 PTR
none none CAC
Li/Ion 5210 RPJ
Global Database View
CAC doesnt have a cell phone RPJ has diabetes
Cell Phones with Li/Ion batteries lead to brain 
tumors in diabetics
Battery Model Diabetes? Brain Tumor? TID
Figure 2.1. Vertically partitioned database
Unless otherwise stated, the model assumed is as follows: There are k parties,
P0;:::;Pk 1. There are a total of n transactions for whom information is collected.
Party Pi collects information about mi attributes, such that m =
Pk 1
i=0 mi is the
total number of attributes/features. This thesis only considers privacy-preserving
data mining in the case of vertical partitioning of data. For the sake of completeness,
the following section gives some detail on horizontal partitioning of data.
2.2.2 Horizontal Partitioning
In horizontal partitioning (a.k.a. homogeneous distribution), dierent sites col-
lect the same set of information, but about dierent entities. An example of that
would be grocery shopping data collected by dierent supermarkets (also known as
market-basket data in the data mining literature). Figure 2.2 illustrates horizon-
tal partitioning and shows the credit card databases of two dierent (local) credit
unions. Taken together, one may nd that fraudulent customers often have similar
transaction histories, etc.8
Bank A (Credit Card)
Global Database View
47906
98052
<20
<5
<$1000
$5000
Active
Passive
RPJ
CAC
ZIP #Transactions Credit Status TID
Bank B (Credit Card)
85732
47907
<20
>100
$10000
>$50000
Passive
Active
ABC
XYZ
Figure 2.2. Horizontally partitioned database
These dierent partitionings pose dierent problems, leading to dierent algo-
rithms for privacy-preserving data mining.
2.3 State of the Art in Secure Multiparty Computation
Consider a set of parties who do not trust each other, nor the channels by which
they communicate. Still, the parties wish to correctly compute some common func-
tion of their local inputs, while keeping their local data as private as possible. This,
in a nutshell, is the problem of Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC). It is clear
that the problem we wish to solve, privacy-preserving data mining, is a special case
of the secure multi-party computation problem.
Before proposing algorithms that preserve privacy, it is important to dene the
notion of privacy. The framework of secure multiparty computation provides a solid9
theoretical underpinning for privacy. The key notion is to show that a protocol re-
veals nothing except the results. This is done by showing how everything seen during
the protocol can be simulated from knowing the input and the output of the protocol.
Yao rst postulated the two-party comparison problem (Yao's Millionaire Protocol)
and developed a provably secure solution [92]. This was extended to multiparty
computations (for any computable functionality) by Goldreich et al. [40] and to the
malicious model of computation by Ben-Or et al. [11]. Overall, a framework was
developed for secure multiparty computation. Goldreich [39] shows that computing
a function privately is equivalent to computing it securely.
We now cover some of the dierent models of computation in SMC.
2.3.1 Trusted Third Party Model
The gold standard for security is the assumption that we have a trusted third
party to whom we can give all data. The third party performs the computation
and delivers only the results { except for the third party, it is clear that nobody
learns anything not inferable from its own input and the results. The goal of secure
protocols is to reach this same level of privacy preservation, without the (potentially
insoluble) problem of nding a third party that everyone trusts.
2.3.2 Semi-honest Model
The Semi-honest model is also known in the literature as the honest-but-curious
model. A semi-honest party follows the rules of the protocol using its correct input,
but after the protocol is free to use whatever it sees during execution of the protocol
to compromise security / privacy.10
Two party computation
A formal denition of private two party computation in the semi-honest model is
given below. Computing a function privately is equivalent to computing it securely.
The formal proof of this can be found in [39].
Denition 2.3.1 (privacy w.r.t. semi-honest behavior) [39]:
Let f : f0;1g
  f0;1g
 7 ! f0;1g
  f0;1g
 be a probabilistic, polynomial-
time functionality, where f1 (x;y)(respectively, f2 (x;y) denotes the rst (respectively,
second) element of f (x;y)). Let  be two-party protocol for computing f.
Let the view of the rst (respectively, second) party during an execution of 
on (x;y), view
1 (x;y) (respectively, view
2 (x;y)) be (x;r1;m1;:::;mt) (respectively,
(y;r2;m1;:::;mt)) where r1 represent the outcome of the rst (respectively, r2 sec-
ond) party's internal coin tosses, and mi represents the ith message it has received.
The output of the rst (respectively, second) party during an execution of  on
(x;y) is denoted output
1 (x;y) (respectively, output
2 (x;y)) and is implicit in the
party's view of the execution.
 privately computes f if there exist probabilistic polynomial time algorithms S1
and S2 such that
f(S1 (x;f1 (x;y));f2 (x;y))gx;y2f0;1g
 
C
n
view

1 (x;y);output

2 (x;y)
o
x;y2f0;1g

f(f1 (x;y);S2 (x;f1 (x;y)))gx;y2f0;1g 
C
n
output

1 (x;y);view

2 (x;y)
o
x;y2f0;1g
where C denotes computational indistinguishability.
Privacy by Simulation The above denition says that a computation is secure
if the view of each party during the execution of the protocol can be eectively
simulated given the input and the output of that party. Thus, in all of our proofs
of security, we only need to show the existence of a simulator for each party that
satises the above equations.
This does not quite guarantee that private information is protected. Whatever
information can be deduced from the nal result obviously cannot be kept private.11
For example, consider a secure sum functionality which simply outputs the sum of
the local input of the participants. With two parties, the output reveals the input
of the other party. This is an artifact of the functionality itself, not of the process of
computing it. Thus, this breach of privacy cannot be avoided as long as computing
the result is deemed necessary. The key to the denition of privacy is that nothing
is learned beyond what is inherent in the result.
A key result we use is the composition theorem. We state it for the semi-honest
model. A detailed discussion of this theorem, as well as the proof, can be found
in [39].
Theorem 2.3.1 (Composition Theorem for the semi-honest model): Suppose that g
is privately reducible to f and that there exists a protocol for privately computing f.
Then there exists a protocol for privately computing g.
Proof. Refer to [39].
In summary, a truly secure multi-party protocol should not reveal more informa-
tion to a particular party than the information that can be induced by looking at
that party's input and the nal output.
Multiparty computation
The above denitions are easily extended to more than two parties.. Details can
be found in [39].
2.3.3 Malicious Model
In the malicious model, no restrictions are placed on any of the participants.
Thus any party is completely free to indulge in whatever actions it pleases.
Similar denitions of privacy/security exist for both two-party and multi-party
computation in this model. The key result of Goldreich is valid even in the case of
malicious adversaries. Details can be found in [39].12
In general, it is quite dicult to develop ecient protocols that are still valid un-
der the malicious model. However, the semi-honest model does not provide sucient
protection for many application. As an intermediate step, it is possible to develop
protocols valid under a weakened malicious model { for example, still assuming no
collusion between parties, no guarantees on the results if a party is malicious, but
a guarantee that there is no disclosure to a malicious party beyond that the party
could achieve in the trusted third party model. Other such models are also possible
requiring successively stricter conditions.
Despite all of such models, it is still possible for parties to actually modify their
inputs to the protocol to begin with. Since this problem exists even with the trusted
third party model itself, it is not addressed by cryptography. Other models are
needed to address this problem. We discuss one such notion below, which should be
used in conjunction with cryptographic approaches.
2.3.4 Other (Partial) Models { Incentive Compatibility
While the semi-honest and malicious models have been well researched in the
cryptographic community, other models outside the purview of cryptography are
possible. One example is the interesting economic notion of incentive compatibility.
A protocol is incentive compatible if it can be shown that a cheating party is either
caught or else suers an economic loss. Under the rational model of economics,
this would serve to ensure that parties do not have any advantage by cheating. Of
course, in an irrational model (for example { in the case of a monopoly where one
party is willing to suer losses to ensure the loss/elimination of another party), this
would not work. Incentive compatibility can be used with methods presented in
this dissertation to ensure that complete data mining applications provide adequate
privacy protection.13
2.4 State of the Art in Privacy Preserving Data Mining Algorithms
The solutions proposed in this thesis rely mostly on cryptographic techniques.
However, other techniques have also been used with some success. We now give a
brief overview of other techniques as well as note other solutions that have been
developed independent of this thesis.
2.4.1 Data Perturbation Techniques
The basic idea of data perturbation is to alter the data so that real individual
data values cannot be recovered, while preserving the utility of the data for statistical
summaries. Since the data doesn't reect the real values of private data, even if a
data item is linked to an individual that individual's privacy is not violated. (It
is important that such data sets are known to be perturbed, so anyone attempting
to misuse the data knows the data cannot be trusted.) This approach has been
brought to a high art by the U.S. Census Bureau with the Public Use Microdata sets.
A primary perturbation technique used is data swapping: exchanging data values
between records in ways that preserve certain statistics, but destroy real values [64].
An alternative is randomization: Adding noise to data to prevent discovery of the
real values. Since the data no longer reects real-world values, it cannot be (mis)used
to violate individual privacy. The challenge is obtaining valid data mining results
from the perturbed data.
In [7], Agrawal and Srikant presented the rst solution to this problem. Given
the distribution of the noise added to the data, and the randomized data set, they
were able to reconstruct the distribution (but not actual data values) of the data set.
This enabled a data mining algorithm to construct a much more accurate decision
tree than mining the randomized data alone, approaching the accuracy of a decision
tree constructed on the real data.
Other methods for distribution reconstruction have also been developed. Agrawal
and Aggarwal [2] developed an approach based on Expectation Maximization that14
also gave a better denition of privacy, and an improved algorithm. Evmievski
et al. [33] applied a similar technique to mine association rules. Rizvi and Haritsa
[80] consider the case where dierent item values (0 and 1) have diering privacy
requirements. Polat and Du [74] propose a technique for doing collaborative ltering
using randomized perturbation techniques. Solutions for other data mining tasks are
certainly feasible. While one will not get the exact same data mining results post-
randomization as pre-randomization, the results have been experimentally shown
to be accurate enough in the case of both classication [7] and association rule
mining [33].
One concern with randomization approaches it that the very techniques that
allow us to reconstruct distributions also give information about the original data
values. For example, consider the case of perturbing age. It is clear from the general
distribution of age that there are no drivers under 16. Assume that it is known that
randomization was done by adding noise randomly chosen from the range [-15,15].
Though the reconstructed distribution does not appear to tell us the age of any
individual { a driver who is 40 years old is equally likely to have their age given as
anything from 25 to 55 { but what about an individual whose age is shown as 1
in the noisy data? We know (from the reconstructed distribution) that no drivers
are under the age of 16 { so the driver whose age is given as 1 in the noisy data
must be 16 years old! Work has been done to quantify the privacy provided by
randomization techniques; they must be used carefully to ensure that the desired
privacy is really achieved. Kargupta et al. [52] formally analyze the security of
randomization techniques and show that in many cases it falls short of the desired
minimum. Evmievski et al. [32] show how to limit privacy breaches while using
randomization for privacy preserving data mining.15
2.4.2 Secure Multiparty Computation Based Solutions
There have been some cryptography based algorithms as well. Lindell and
Pinkas [59] rst introduced a secure multi-party computation technique for classica-
tion using the ID3 algorithm, over horizontally partitioned data. Du and Zhan [28]
propose a cryptographic protocol for making the ID3 algorithm privacy preserv-
ing over vertically partitioned data. Lin and Clifton [58] propose a secure way for
clustering using the EM algorithm [25] over horizontally partitioned data. Kantar-
cioglu and Clifton describe protocols for privacy preserving distributed data mining
of association rules on horizontally partitioned data [48, 50], privately computing
distributed top-k queries [49]. Kantarcioglu and Vaidya [47] present an architecture
for privacy preserving mining of client information. Agrawal et al. [3] present a tech-
nique for computing set intersection, union, and equi-joins for two parties. Clifton
et al. provide a good overview of tools for privacy preserving distributed data min-
ing [22], while Clifton and Marks [23] present an early position paper on the privacy
implications of data mining.
2.5 Other Work
There has been some other work that does not properly fall into either the per-
turbation or cryptographic categories. Atallah et. al [8] explore the disclosure lim-
itation of sensitive rules. Saygin et al. [83] present a way of using special values,
known as \unknowns", to prevent the discovery of association rules. Oliveira and
Zaiane [69{72] develop several dierent methods for association rule mining, clus-
tering and access control for privacy preserving data mining. There has also been
extensive work done in statistical databases. This work is outside the scope of this
thesis, however, Adam and Wortmann [1] provide a good starting point. There has
also been extensive work in cryptography creating building blocks, which is also
outside the scope of this thesis. Many examples can be found in [26].16
3 PROBLEMS ADDRESSED
This chapter covers the various data mining problems solved in this thesis. Solutions
to the primitives used are presented in the following chapter.
3.1 Two-party Association Rule Mining
This section presents a way to mine association rules from vertically partitioned
data. This section presents an algorithm for two parties while the following section
presents a general solution for multiple parties. Informally, the problem is to mine
association rules across two heterogeneous data sets. One database is designated the
primary, and is the initiator of the protocol. The other database is the responder.
There is a join key present in both databases. The remaining attributes are present
in one database or the other, but not both. The goal is to nd association rules
involving attributes other than the join key.
3.1.1 Problem Denition
The association rule mining problem can be formally stated as follows [4]: Let
I = fi1;i2;;img be a set of literals, called items. Let D be a set of transactions,
where each transaction T is a set of items such that T  I. Associated with
each transaction is a unique identier, called its TID. We say that a transaction
T contains X, a set of some items in I, if X  T. An association rule is an
implication of the form, X ) Y , where X  I, Y  I, and X \ Y = . The rule
X ) Y holds in the transaction set D with condence c if c% of transactions in D
that contain X also contain Y . The rule X ) Y has support s in the transaction
set D if s% of transactions in D contain X [ Y .17
Within this framework, we consider mining boolean association rules. The ab-
sence or presence of an attribute is represented as a 0 or 1. Transactions are strings
of 0 and 1; the database can be represented as a matrix of f0,1g.
3.1.2 Algorithm
The algorithm is based on the classic Apriori algorithm of Agrawal and Srikant [5].
The key issue is computing the support of an itemset. To nd out if a particular
itemset is frequent, we count the number of records where the values for all the
attributes in the itemset are 1. This translates into a simple mathematical problem,
given the following denitions:
Let the total number of attributes be l+m, where A has l attributes A1 through
Al, and B has the remaining m attributes B1 through Bm. Transactions/records are
a sequence of l + m 1s or 0s. Let k be the support threshold required, and n be the
total number of transaction/records.
Let ~ X and ~ Y represent columns in the database, i.e., xi = 1 i row i has value 1
for attribute X. The scalar (or dot) product of two cardinality n vectors ~ X and ~ Y
is dened as
~ X  ~ Y =
n X
i=1
xi  yi
Determining if the two-itemset hXY i is frequent thus reduces to testing if ~ X~ Y  k.
In Section 4.3 we present an ecient way to compute scalar product ~ X~ Y without
either side disclosing its vector. First we will show how to generalize the above
protocol from two-itemsets to general association rules without sharing information
other than through scalar product computation.
The generalization of this protocol to a w-itemset is straightforward. Assume A
has p attributes a1 :::ap and B has q attributes b1 :::bq, and we want to compute
the frequency of the w = p+q-itemset ha1;:::;ap;b1;:::;bqi. Each item in ~ X (~ Y ) is
composed of the product of the corresponding individual elements, i.e., xi =
Qp
j=1 aj
and yi =
Qq
j=1 bj. This computes ~ X and ~ Y without sharing information between18
A and B. The scalar product protocol then securely computes the frequency of the
entire w-itemset.
For example, suppose we want to compute if a particular 5-itemset is frequent,
with A having 2 of the attributes, and B having the remaining 3 attributes. I.e., A
and B want to know if the itemset l = hAa;Ab;Ba;Bb;Bci is frequent. A creates a
new vector ~ X of cardinality n where ~ X = ~ Aa  ~ Ab (component multiplication) and
B creates a new vector ~ Y of cardinality n where ~ Y = ~ Ba  ~ Bb  ~ Bc. Now the scalar
product of ~ X and ~ Y provides the (in)frequency of the itemset.
The complete algorithm to nd frequent itemsets is:
1. L1 = flarge 1-itemsetsg
2. for (k=2; Lk 1 6= ; k++) do begin
3. Ck = apriori-gen(Lk 1);
4. for all candidates c 2 Ck do begin
5. if all the attributes in c are entirely at A or B
6. that party independently calculates c:count
7. else
8. let A have l of the attributes and B have the remaining m attributes
9. construct ~ X on A's side and ~ Y on B's side where ~ X =
Ql
i=1 ~ Ai and ~ Y =
Qm
i=1 ~ Bi
10. compute c:count = ~ X  ~ Y =
Pn
i=1 xi  yi
11. endif
12. Lk = Lk [ cjc:count  minsup
13. end
14. end
15. Answer = [kLk
In step 3, the function apriori-gen takes the set of large itemsets Lk 1 found in
the (k   1)th pass as an argument and generates the set of candidate itemsets Ck.
This is done by generating a superset of possible candidate itemsets and pruning
this set. [5] discusses the function in detail.19
Given the counts and frequent itemsets, we can compute all association rules
with support  minsup.
Only the steps 1, 3, 10 and 12 require sharing information. Since the nal result
[kLk is known to both parties, steps 1, 3 and 12 reveal no extra information to either
party. Section 4.3 shows how to compute step 10 without revealing information.
3.1.3 Security Analysis
For a complete security analysis of the process, we must rst analyze the security
of the component scalar product protocol, and then analyze the security of the entire
association rule mining algorithm.
The security of the scalar product protocol is based on the inability of either side
to solve k equations in more than k unknowns. More details are given in Section
4.3.4.
Therefore, the disclosure risk in this method is based on the number of data
values that the other party might know from some external source. The scalar
product protocol is used once for every candidate item set. Multiple w-itemsets in
the candidate set may be split as 1, w   1 on each side. Consider two possible
candidate sets A1;B1;B2;B5 and A1;B2;B3. If A uses new/dierent equations for
each candidate set, it imperils the security of A1. However, B can reuse the values
sent the rst time. The equations sent by B can be reused for the same combinations
of Bi, only a new sum must be sent. This reveals an additional equation, limiting
the number of times B can run the protocol.
3.1.4 Computation and Communication Analysis
The overall computation and communication analysis for the entire association
rule mining algorithm hinges on the computation and communication cost of the
scalar product protocol. The computation cost of the scalar product protocol is
O(n2) arithmetic operations, which is extremely low. There is no communication20
cost for any itemset wholly contained on either side. For every itemset split between
the 2 parties, we engage in the scalar product protocol once. As noted earlier, values
that have already been sent can be reused. The entire algorithm extends the apriori
algorithm. Essentially we provide a means of determining if a candidate itemset is
frequent. The communication cost can be expressed in terms of the i/o cost of the
apriori algorithm, in fact a constant multiple of the i/o cost of the apriori algorithm.
3.2 Three or More Party Association Rule Mining
An association rule is a simple probabilistic statement about the co-occurrence of
certain events in a database, and is particularly applicable to sparse transaction data
sets. The general idea of nding association rules originated in applications involving
\market-basket data". These data are usually recorded in a database such that each
observation consists of an actual basket of items (such as grocery items), and the
variables indicate whether or not a particular item was purchased. Association rules
were invented as a way to nd simple patterns in such data in a relatively ecient
computational manner.
We now formally dene the association rule mining problem for heterogeneous
distribution of data over multiple parties.
3.2.1 Problem Denition
Let there be k (> 2) parties P1;P2;:::;Pk. The database is vertically partitioned
between the k parties. The association rule mining problem has already been for-
mally stated in Section 3.1.1. The goal is to nd association rules over the attributes
across all of the parties.21
3.2.2 Algorithm
A transaction database can be represented in several ways. One is to describe it as
a mn boolean matrix, where m represents the number of items/attributes/features
and n represents the number of transactions. A 1 denotes the presence of an item
in the transaction, a 0 represents its absence.
A second representation is the transaction identier (TID) list approach. Every
attribute/feature has a transaction identier (TID) list associated with it. This TID-
list contains the identiers of transactions that contain the attribute. This is a more
compact representation in practice, as most transactions are sparse (contain few
items). It also lends itself well to secure processing with our size of set intersection
protocol.
A clearer explanation of these representations is given by the following example.
Consider a database having ten transactions TID1;TID2;:::;TID10, and three at-
tributes A, B, and C. The gure 3.1 illustrates the boolean matrix view and the
TID-list view of the database. The gure also gives the TID-list of all combinations
of attributes. It is clear that a transaction supports an itemset (set of attributes) if
and only if its TID is present in the TID-list for all the attributes in the itemset.
To nd the number of transactions that support a given itemset we need only nd
the cardinality of the intersection set of the TID-lists of these attributes.
Sections 4.1 and 4.2 present an ecient way to compute the cardinality of the
intersection set without disclosing the items in that set. We now show how to
generalize these protocols from a k-itemset where each party has one of the attributes
to general association rules. This generalization shares no information other than
through computing the size of the set intersections.
We rst show how this can be generalized to the case where a single party con-
tributes fewer or more than one attribute to the itemset. A party that has none
of the attributes does not participate in the protocol. This reveals that it does not
have the attribute, but which attribute is at which site is presumed to be public.22
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Figure 3.1. An example database in its various representations23
It is the transactions, and which attributes are in which transaction, that must be
kept private. If a party contributes more than one attribute, it locally computes the
intersection before participating in the protocol.
For example, suppose we want to compute if a particular 5-itemset is frequent,
with
 P1 having 2 of the attributes, A11;A13,
 P2 having 2 of the attributes, A22;A23, and
 P3 having the remaining 1 attribute, A31.
P1, P2 and P3 want to know if the itemset l = hA11;A13;A22;A23;A31i is frequent.
P1 locally generates the set S1 = S11\S13, P2 locally generates the set S2 = S22\S23
and P3 generates the set S3 = S31. jS1 \ S2 \ S3j is the frequency of the itemset.
The full procedure for computing frequent itemsets is given in Algorithm 1. In
step 4, the function apriori-gen takes the set of large itemsets Lk 1 found in the
(k   1)th pass as an argument and generates the set of candidate itemsets Ck. This
is done by generating a superset of possible candidate itemsets and pruning this
set. [5] discusses the function in detail. Given the counts and frequent itemsets, we
can compute all association rules with support  minsup.
Two-itemsets pose a special problem, as the set intersection protocols only work
for three or more parties. Assuming we have at least three parties overall, we can
use one as an \untrusted third party" to compute the size of 2-itemsets. This is
analogous to the leaf actions of Protocol 18 (Section 4.2): the two parties exchange
keys, hash their items with both keys, and send the hashed sets to the third party.
The third party reports the size of the set if it is greater than the threshold. The same
argument as in the proof of Protocol 18 demonstrates the security of this approach.24
1: L1 = flarge 1-itemsetsg
2: for (k = 2;Lk 1 6= ;;k + +) do
3: Lk = ;
4: Ck = apriori-gen(Lk 1);
5: for all candidates c 2 Ck do
6: if all the attributes in c are entirely at any one party Pl then
7: party Pl independently calculates c:count
8: else
9: let P1 have l1 of the attributes, ..., Pk have lk attributes (
Pk
i=1 li = jcj)
10: construct S1 on P1's side, ..., Sk on Pk's side,
11: where Si = Si1 \ ::: \ Sili; 1  i  k
12: compute c:count = j \j=1::k Sjj using Protocol 17 or 18
13: end if
14: Lk = Lk [ cjc:count  minsup
15: end for
16: end for
17: Answer = [kLk
Algorithm 1: Privacy Preserving Association Rule Mining Algorithm25
3.2.3 Proof of Correctness
Candidate itemsets are generated by a straightforward application of the Apriori-
gen procedure. For the proof of correctness of that procedure refer to [6]. As long
as the input to the procedure is correct, the Ck sets are generated correctly.
We show by induction that the Lj sets are generated correctly. For the basis
step with j = 1, L1 is correctly generated directly from the data. Assume that Lk 1
has been correctly generated. Hence Ck is generated correctly from Lk 1. Assuming
that step 12 computes the count correctly, Lk is correctly computed.
The critical step is computing c:count, step 12. The correctness of Protocols
17 and 18 is given in section 4.1 and section 4.2. Thus, the entire association rule
mining algorithm gives correct results.
3.2.4 Computation and Communication Analysis
The communication analysis critically depends on the number of times step 12 is
called. For each call to step 12, we incur the cost of the set intersection algorithm.
If we let r be the maximum size of a frequent itemset (i.e., no frequent r+1-itemsets
are found), and let Ci;(i = 1:::r) represent the number of candidate itemsets at
each round, the total communication using Protocol 18 is:
Pr
i=1 Ci  (3k   4) messages
Pr
i=1 Ci  2(k   1)  (m  hashed item size + k log2(k)  hash key size) bits
Surprisingly, a much more ecient association rule mining can be constructed
using Protocol 17. The goal of association rule mining is to nd all frequent itemsets.
If we use Protocol 17 to immediately nd the size of j\i=1::k Skj, each party also has
enough information to nd the intersection sizes, or support, of all smaller itemsets
that do not include its own items. The \aw" in Protocol 17 becomes a benet.
Each party compute all frequent itemsets based on the hashed sets received in the
initial intersection stage. If any of the frequent itemsets involve its neighbor's set,
the corresponding hashed sets are forwarded to its neighbor. This gives every site26
complete information, but still prevents probing. The new association rule mining
algorithm can be dened as follows:
Call Protocol 17, with each attribute treated as a dierent site (even if both are
at the same site.)
Perform local association rule mining on the TSj to determine frequent itemsets
not involving ones own attributes
if Any frequent itemsets involve ones left or right neighbor then
Send the support of those itemsets to the neighbor
end if
Since the only action carried out involves calling the set intersection protocol, the
security analysis of this algorithm is completely reducible to the security of the set
intersection protocol. The one caveat is that each site learns the support of itemsets
in which it does not participate, even if they are below the support threshold. This
is less secure than Algorithm 1, but still does not reveal individual itemsets or allow
probing.
Since only one call to the set intersection algorithm takes place, the communi-
cation analysis is straightforward. Note that all the attributes that are frequent
1-itemsets are sent for intersection. No local intersection is carried out. The com-
munication cost is therefore
k  (2k   2) = O(k2) messages
K  (2K   2)  m  encrypted item size = O(K2m) bits
k rounds
where K is the number of frequent attributes rather than the number of sites.
It is important to note that this communication cost is dependent entirely upon
the number of attributes, rather, a constant times the size of the database. It
is independent of the number of iterations of the Apriori [5] algorithm. This is
likely to lead to huge cost savings in extremely high dimensional, high transactional
databases.27
The computational complexity can be easily dened in terms of the computational
complexity of the underlying size of set intersection algorithm. Since, the size of set
intersection algorithm is only called once, the overhead in computational complexity
beyond that of Apriori is exactly the cost of a single invocation of the set intersection
algorithm. This cost can be found in section 4.1.3 and section 4.2.3.
3.2.5 Security Analysis
Only steps 1, 12 and 14 require exchanging information. Since the nal result
[kLk is known to both parties, steps 1 and 14 reveal no additional information.
In Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we show how to compute step 12 revealing only limited
information.
Theorem 3.2.1 Algorithm 1 privately computes the association rules present in the
database without revealing any information other than the support of all the possible
itemsets.
Proof. We use the basic idea of proof by simulation described in Section 2.3.
The key idea is to show that everything seen in the protocol can be simulated by
knowing just the input and the output. The security of the protocol is based upon
the security of steps 1, 12 and 14. The nal result [kLk is known to both parties,
so steps 1 and 14 can be simulated directly from the result.
Step 12 consists of an invocation of a protocol to compute the size of set inter-
section (Protocol 17 or 18). The security discussion of those protocols can be found
in Sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.4. By appropriately setting the parameter r to minsupport
causes the protocol to abort if the itemset is not supported, so we only learn the
support of supported itemsets. Apart from giving the nal count, Protocols 17 and
18 also reveal the sizes of some (or all) subsets of the itemset being tested (further
details can be found in Sections 4.1.4 and 4.2.4). However, a candidate k-itemset is
only generated if all its subsets are frequent. The result [kLk of Algorithm 1 includes
all frequent subsets. If we also include the support of the supported itemsets in the28
result, as is commonly done in association rule mining, the size of these frequent
subsets is also known. These sizes can be provided as input to the simulator to
prove the security of Protocols 17 and 18.
Now, we use the composition theorem 2.3.1 to prove the overall security of the
algorithm. Treating Protocols 17 and 18 as f, since their security is proven, we show
that the association rule computation, g, is computed privately.
This demonstrates that the association rule mining algorithm (Algorithm 1) is
fully secure under the Secure Multiparty Computation denitions.
3.3 k-means Clustering
Cluster Analysis is the problem of decomposing or partitioning a (usually mul-
tivariate) data set into groups so that the points in one group are similar to each
other and are as dierent as possible from the points in other groups [44]. There are
many situations where clustering can lead to the discovery of important knowledge
but privacy/security reasons restrict the sharing of data.
Imagine the following scenario. A law enforcement agency wants to cluster indi-
viduals based on their nancial transactions, and study the dierences between the
clusters and known money laundering operations. Knowing the dierences and simi-
larities between normal individuals and known money launderers would enable better
direction of investigations. Currently, an individual's nancial transactions may be
divided between banks, credit card companies, tax collection agencies, etc. Each
of these (presumably) has eective controls governing release of the information.
These controls are not perfect, but violating them (either technologically or through
insider misuse) reveals only a subset of an individual's nancial records. The law
enforcement agency could promise to provide eective controls, but now overcoming
them gives access to an individual's entire nancial history. This raises justiable
concerns among privacy advocates. What is required is a privacy preserving way of
doing clustering.29
We focus on k-means clustering [29,38] which is a simple technique to group items
into k clusters. k-means clustering is an iterative algorithm, which starts o with ran-
dom cluster centers. A single iteration assigns all objects to the closest clusters based
on their distances from the cluster means and then recomputes the cluster means.
Iterations are repeated until the algorithm converges to a set of stable clusters. The
basic k-means clustering algorithm is given below:
Initialize the k means 1 :::k to 0.
Arbitrarily select k starting points 0
1 :::0
k
repeat
Assign 0
1 :::0
k to 1 :::k respectively
for all points i do
Assign point i to cluster j if distance d(i;j) is the minimum over all j.
end for
Calculate new means 0
1 :::0
k.
until the dierence between 1 :::k and 0
1 :::0
k is acceptably low.
The results come in two forms: Assignment of entities to clusters, and the cluster
centers themselves. We assume that the cluster centers i are semiprivate infor-
mation, i.e., each site can learn only the components of  that correspond to the
attributes it holds. Thus, all information about a site's attributes (not just individual
values) is kept private; if sharing the  is desired, an evaluation of privacy/secrecy
concerns can be performed after the values are known.
At rst glance, this might appear simple { each site can simply run the k-means
algorithm on its own data. This would preserve complete privacy. Figure 3.2 shows
why this will not work. Assume we want to perform 2-means clustering on the data
in the gure. From y's point of view (looking solely at the vertical axis), it appears
that there are two clusters centered at about 2 and 5.5. However in two dimensions it
is clear that the dierence in the horizontal axis dominates. The clusters are actually
\left" and \right", with both having a mean in the y dimension of about 3. The
problem is exacerbated by higher dimensionality.30
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
 
y
a
x
i
s
 
 
 xaxis  
Title of the graph 
Example
Data Points
Projections
Figure 3.2. Two dimensional problem that cannot be decomposed
into two one-dimensional problems
3.3.1 Basic Approach
Given a mapping of points to clusters, each site can independently compute
the components of i corresponding to its attributes. Assigning points to clusters,
specically computing which cluster gives the minimum d(i;j), requires cooperation
between the sites. We show how to privately compute this in Section 3.3.2. Briey,
the idea is that site A generates a (dierent) vector (of length k) for every site
(including itself) such that the vector sum of all the site vectors is ~ 0. Each site
adds its local dierences jpoint   ij to its vector. At the same time, the vector is
permuted in an order known only to A. Each site (except a single holdout) sends
their permuted vector to site B. Site B sums the received vectors, then the holdout
site and B perform a series of secure additions and comparisons to nd the minimum31
i without learning distances. B now asks A the real index corresponding to i, giving
the proper cluster for the point.
The second problem is knowing when to quit, i.e., when the dierence between
 and 0 is small enough; we show how to privately compute this in Algorithm 3.
This makes use of secure sum and secure comparison, described on Page 36.
3.3.2 Algorithm
First, we formally dene the problem. Let r be the number of parties, each
having dierent attributes for the same set of entities. n is the number of the
common entities. The parties wish to cluster their joint data using the k-means
algorithm. Let k be the number of clusters required.
The nal result of the k-means clustering algorithm is the value/position of the
means of the k clusters, with each side only knowing the means corresponding to
their own attributes, and the nal assignment of entities to clusters. Let each cluster
mean be represented as i;i = 1;:::;k. Let ij represent the projection of the mean
of cluster i on party j. Thus, the nal result for party j is
 the nal value/position of ij;i = 1:::k
 cluster assignments: clusti for all points (i = 1;:::;n)
The k-means algorithm also requires an initial assignment (approximation) for
the values/positions of the k means. This is an important issue, as the choice of initial
points determines the nal solution. Research has led to mechanisms producing a
good initial assignment [15]. Their technique uses classic k-means clustering done
over multiple subsamples of the data, followed by clustering the results to get the
initial points. For simplicity, we assume that the k means are selected arbitrarily.
Since the underlying operations in [15] involve k-means clustering, it is possible to
extend our algorithm to search for and start o with good initial means.
Thus, for i = 1:::k, every party selects its share 0
ij of any given mean. This
value is local to each party and is unknown to the other parties.32
The basic algorithm directly follows the standard k-means algorithm. The ap-
proximations to the true means are iteratively rened until the improvement in one
iteration is below a threshold. At each iteration, every point is assigned to the proper
cluster, i.e., we securely nd the cluster with the minimum distance for each point
(this is described in Section 3.3.2.) Once these mappings are known, the local com-
ponents of each cluster mean can be computed locally. We then use Algorithm 3
(checkThreshold) to test termination: was the improvement to the mean approxi-
mation in that iteration below a threshold? This is shown formally in Algorithm 2.
The checkThreshold algorithm (Algorithm 3) is straightforward, except that
to maintain security (and practicality) all arithmetic must be modn. This results
in a non-obvious threshold evaluation at the end, consisting of a secure addition /
comparison. Intervals are compared rather than the actual numbers. Since Th < n=2
and the domain of  D < n=2, if the result of m Th0 is positive, it will be less than
n=2, and if it is negative, due to the modulo operation, it will be greater than n=2.
Thus, m   Th0 > Th0   m(modn) if and only if m < Th0, and the correct result is
returned.
Securely Finding the Closest Cluster
This algorithm is used as a subroutine in the k-means clustering algorithm to pri-
vately nd the cluster which is closest to the given point, i.e., which cluster should
a point be assigned to. Thus, the algorithm is invoked for every single data point
in each iteration. Each party has as its input the component of the distance corre-
sponding to each of the k clusters. This is equivalent to having a matrix of distances
of dimension k  r. For common distance metrics; such as Euclidean, Manhattan,
or any other Minkowski; this translates to nding the cluster where the sum of the
local distances is the minimum among all the clusters.33
Require: r parties, k clusters, n points.
1: for all sites j = 1:::r do
2: for all clusters i = 1:::k do
3: initialize 0
ij arbitrarily
4: end for
5: end for
6: repeat
7: for all j = 1:::r do
8: for i = 1:::k do
9: ij   0
ij
10: Cluster[i] = ;
11: end for
12: end for
13: for g = 1:::n do
14: for all j = 1:::r do
15: fCompute the distance vector ~ Xj (to each cluster) for point g.g
16: for i = 1:::k do
17: xij = jdatagj  D ijj
18: end for
19: end for
20: Each site puts g into Cluster[closest cluster] fclosest cluster is Algorithm
4g
21: end for
22: for all j = 1:::r do
23: for i = 1:::k do
24: 0
ij   mean of j's attributes for points in Cluster[i]
25: end for
26: end for
27: until checkThreshold fAlgorithm 3g
Algorithm 2: Privacy Preserving k-means clustering34
Require: Th is a threshold for termination, Random number generator rand pro-
duces values uniformly distributed over 0::n   1 spanning (at least) twice the
domain of the distance function  D.
1: for all j = 1:::r do
2: dj   0
3: for i = 1:::k do
4: dj   dj + j0
ij  D ijj
5: end for
6: end for
7: fSecurely compute if
P
dj  Th.g
8: At P1: m = rand()
9: for j=1 ...r-1 do
10: Pi sends m + dj (mod n) to Pj+1
11: end for
12: At Pr: m = m + dr
13: At P1: Th0 = Th + r
14: P1 and Pr return secure add and compare(m   Th0 (mod n) > Th0   m
(mod n)) fSecure comparison is described on Page 36.g
Algorithm 3: checkThreshold: Find out if the new means are suciently close to old
means35
The problem is formally dened as follows. Consider r parties P1;:::;Pr, each
with their own k-element vector ~ Xi:
P1 has ~ X1 =
2
6
6
6
6
6 6
6
6
4
x11
x21
. . .
xk1
3
7
7
7
7
7 7
7
7
5
;P2 has
2
6
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4
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;:::;Pr has
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:
The goal is to compute the index l that represents the row with the minimum sum.
Formally, nd
argmin
i=1::k
(
X
j=1::r
xij)
For use in k-means clustering, xij = jij   pointjj, or site Pj's component of the
distance between a point and the cluster i with mean i.
The security of the algorithm is based on three key ideas.
1. Disguise the site components of the distance with random values that cancel
out when combined.
2. Compare distances so only the comparison result is learned; no party knows
the distances being compared.
3. Permute the order of clusters so the real meaning of the comparison results is
unknown.
The algorithm also requires three non-colluding sites. These parties may be among
the parties holding data, but could be external as well. They need only know the
number of sites r and the number of clusters k. Assuming they do not collude with
each other, they learn nothing from the algorithm. For simplicity of presentation, we
will assume the non-colluding sites are P1, P2, and Pr among the data holders. Using
external sites, instead of participating sites P1, P2 and Pr, to be the non-colluding
sites, is trivial.
The algorithm proceeds as follows. Site P1 generates a length k random vector
~ Vi for each site i, such that
Pr
i=1 ~ Vi = ~ 0. P1 also chooses a permutation  of 1::k.36
P1 then engages each site Pi in the permutation algorithm [27] (see Section A.1.1)
to generate the sum of the vector ~ Vi and Pi's distances ~ Xi. The resulting vector is
known only to Pi, and is permuted by  known only to P1, i.e., Pi has (~ Vi + ~ Xi),
but does not know  or ~ Vi. P1 and P3 :::Pr 1 send their vectors to Pr.
Sites P2 and Pr now engage in a series of secure addition / comparisons to nd
the (permuted) index of the minimum distance. Specically, they want to nd if
Pr
i=1 xli + vli <
Pr
i=1 xmi + vmi. Since 8l;
Pr
i=1 vli = 0, the result is
Pr
i=1 xli <
Pr
i=1 xmi, showing which cluster (l or m) is closest to the point. Pr has all components
of the sum except ~ X2 + ~ V2. For each comparison, we use a secure circuit evaluation
(see Page 36) that calculates a2 + ar < b2 + br, without disclosing anything but the
comparison result. After k   1 such comparisons, keeping the minimum each time,
the minimum cluster is known.
P2 and Pr now know the minimum cluster in the permutation . They do not
know the real cluster it corresponds to (or the cluster that corresponds to any of the
others items in the comparisons.) For this, they send the minimum i back to site
P1. P1 broadcasts the result  1(i), the proper cluster for the point.
The full algorithm is given in Algorithm 4. Several optimizations are possible,
we discuss these when analyzing the complexity of the algorithm in Section 3.3.5.
Section A.1.1 describes the permutation algorithm. We now describe the secure
addition comparison, which builds a circuit that has two inputs from each party, sums
the rst input of both parties and the second input of both parties, and returns the
result of comparing the two sums. This (simple) circuit is evaluated securely using
the generic algorithm described on Page 36. We then prove the security of the
method. A graphical depiction of stages 1 and 2 is given in Figures 3.3 and 3.4.
Secure Comparison
We simply use the generic circuit based evaluation approach for the addition and
comparison function. The function is rst represented as a combinatorial circuit, and37
Require: r parties, each with a length k vector ~ X of distances. Three of these
parties (trusted not to collude) are labeled P1, P2, and Pr.
1: fStage 1: Between P1 and all other partiesg
2: P1 generates r random vectors ~ Vi summing to ~ 0 (see Algorithm 5).
3: P1 generates a random permutation  over k elements
4: for all i = 2:::r do
5: ~ Ti (at Pi) = add and permute(~ Vi;(at P1); ~ Xi(at Pi)) fThis is the permuta-
tion algorithm described in Section A.1.1g
6: end for
7: P1 computes ~ T1 = ( ~ X1 + ~ V1)
8:
9: fStage 2: Between all but P2 and Prg
10: for all i = 1;3:::r   1 do
11: Pi sends ~ Ti to Pr
12: end for
13: Pr computes ~ Y = ~ T1 +
Pr
i=3 ~ Ti
14:
15: fStage 3: Involves only P2 and Prg
16: minimal   1
17: for j=2..k do
18: if secure add and compare(Yj + T2j < Yminimal + T2minimal) then
19: minimal   j
20: end if
21: end for
22:
23: fStage 4: Between Pr (or P2) and P1g
24: Party Pr sends minimal to P1
25: P1 broadcasts the result  1(minimal)
Algorithm 4: closest cluster: Find minimum distance cluster38
Require: Random number generator rand producing values uniformly distributed
over 0::n   1 spanning (at least) the domain of the distance function  D.
Ensure: The sum of the resulting vectors is ~ 0.
1: for all i = 1 ...k do
2: PartSumi   0
3: for j = 2 ...r do
4: Vij   rand()
5: PartSumi   PartSumi + Vij (mod n)
6: end for
7: Vi1    PartSumi (mod n)
8: end for
Algorithm 5: genRandom: Generates a (somewhat) random matrix Vkr
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then the parties run a short protocol for every gate in the circuit. Every participant
gets (randomly selected) shares of the input wires and the output wires for every
gate. Since determining which share goes to which party is done randomly, a party's
own share tells it nothing. Upon completion, the parties exchange their shares,
enabling each to compute the nal result.
While impractical for large inputs and many parties, for a limited number of
simple two-party operations, such as the secure add and compare function used in
Algorithms 3 and 4, the complexity is reasonable. For two parties, the message cost
is O(circuit size), and the number of rounds is constant. We can add and compare
numbers with O(m = log(number of entities)) bits using an O(m) size circuit.
3.3.3 Security Discussion
Closest Cluster Computation Algorithm 4 returns the index of the closest
cluster (i.e., the row with the minimum row sum). To prove this algorithm is privacy
preserving, we must show that each party can construct a polynomial time simulator
for the view that it sees, given only its own input and this closest cluster index.
Theorem 3.3.1 Algorithm 4 privately computes the index of the row with the min-
imum row sum, revealing only this result assuming parties do not collude to expose
other information.
Proof. The simulator is constructed in stages, corresponding to the stages of the
algorithm.
Stage 1: The only communication occurring in this stage occurs in the r   1
calls to the Permutation Algorithm. Thus, we simply need to apply the composition
theorem stated in Theorem 2.3.1, with g being the closest cluster computation al-
gorithm and f being the permutation algorithm. What remains is to show that we
can simulate the result Ti. The simulator for P1 is exactly the algorithm used by P1,
without sending any data. For the remaining sites, since the vi are unknown and41
chosen from a uniform distribution on (0::n   1), vi + xi will also form a uniform
distribution on (0::n 1). Each Pi;i = 2:::r can simulate the vector ~ Ti by selecting
values randomly from a uniform distribution on (0::n 1). This is indistinguishable
from what it sees in the algorithm.
Stage 2: All the parties other than P2 and Pr send their permuted result vectors
to the receiver. Since only Pr sees new information, we need only concern ourselves
with simulating what it sees. The received vectors can be simulated by Pr exactly
as they were simulated by the Pi in Stage 1. The vector ~ Y is equal to the actual
distances minus ~ T2. However, since ~ T2 consists of values uniformly distributed over
(0::n  1), ~ Y is eectively distances   v, and is thus also uniformly distributed over
(0::n 1). However, we cannot simulate it by generating random values, as we must
preserve the relationship ~ Y = ~ T1 +
Pr
j=3 Tj (mod n). Fortunately, the sum of the
simulator-generated ~ Ti will give a vector ~ Y that both meets this constraint and is
uniformly distributed over (0::n 1), giving a view that is indistinguishable from the
real algorithm.
Stage 3: Here P2 and Pr engage in a series of comparisons. Again, we use the
composition theorem. Each comparison is secure, so we need only show that we can
simulate the sequence of comparison results.
The simulator uniformly chooses a random ordering of the k clusters from the
k! possible orderings. We regard this as the distance-wise ordering of the clusters
relative to the point. This ordering is used to choose the appropriate result,  or
>, for each comparison. Eectively, the simulator runs steps 17-21, but makes the
comparisons locally based on the random ordering. The probability of any given
ordering is 1=k!, the same as the probability of any given ordering achieved after the
permutation  in the actual view. Therefore, the probability of any given sequence
of comparison results is the same under the ordering as under the view seen in the
actual algorithm.42
Note that all of the possible 2(k 1) sequences are not equally likely, e.g., the
sequence of all >s corresponds to only one ordering, while the sequence of all s
corresponds to (k   1)! orderings. However, selecting random total orderings gen-
erates sequences matching the (non-uniform) probability distribution of the actual
sequences of comparisons.
Stage 4: Pr (or P2) sends the index i to P1. Since the true index it is the
nal result known to all the parties, and P1 decides upon the permutation , the
simulator generates (it) = i as the message it receives.
The nal result it is sent to all parties. Since this is the nal result, obviously all
the parties can simulate it.
Since this simulator is also linear in the size of the input, and we have proven the
permutation algorithm to be secure, application of the composition theorem proves
that Algorithm 4 preserves privacy.
Stopping Criterion Before analyzing the security of the entire k-means algo-
rithm, we prove the security of the threshold checking Algorithm 3.
Theorem 3.3.2 Algorithm 3 determines if
P
j0
ij  D ijj < Thj, revealing nothing
except the truth of this statement.
Proof. Steps 10 and 14 are the only steps of Algorithm 3 requiring communica-
tion, so the simulator runs the algorithm to this point. In step 10, party P1 rst sends
m + d1 (mod n) where m is the random number known to P1. Each of the parties
Pj;j = 2:::r receive a message m +
Pi
j=1 dj from their left neighbor. Since m is
chosen from a uniform distribution on (0:::n 1), and all arithmetic is mod n, this
sum forms a uniform distribution on (0:::n 1) and can be simulated by generating
a random number over that distribution:
Pr
h
V IEW
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The secure add and compare algorithm gives only the nal result: m   Th0
(mod n) > Th0  m (mod n) =
Pr
j=1 dj  Th. Step 14 is easily simulated knowing
that result.
This simulator runs in the O(k) time required by the Algorithm, and is thus
polynomial. Applying the composition theorem with Algorithm 3 as f and taking
g to be the secure add and compare algorithm, along with the other facts given
above, proves that Algorithm 3 is secure.
Overall k-means algorithm We now analyze the security of the entire k-
means algorithm. In every iteration, the following things are revealed to the parties:
 Each party's local share of the k cluster means.
 The cluster assignment for every point.
These values are the desired result of the nal iteration. Since it is impossible to
know in advance the number of iterations required to halt, the number of iterations
needs to be accepted as part of the nal output. The results from the intermediate
iterations may be used to infer information beyond this result. For example, if the
cluster centers for site j do not change between iterations, and a point moves between
two clusters, site j knows that those two clusters are both relatively close to the point
across the sum of the other sites. However, since the location of the point in the
other dimensions is not known, this information is of little use. In any iteration the
nal assignment of points to clusters is the same for every party. If this intermediate
assignment should not be revealed, either a genuine third party will be required
or else the algorithm will be quite inecient. Allowing the intermediate results
to be accepted as part of overall results allows an ecient algorithm with provable44
security properties. Forbidding knowledge of intermediate results would prevent each
site from computing the next iteration locally, making the entire computation much
more expensive.
We therefore state the proven overall security properties in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3.3 Algorithm 2 is a private algorithm computing the k clusters of the
combined data set, revealing at most the point assignment to clusters at each iteration
and the number of iterations required to converge.
Proof. All of the communication in Algorithm 2 all occurs in the calls to Algo-
rithms 4 and 3. The results of Algorithm 4 are point assignments to clusters, and
can be simulated from the known result for that iteration. The results of Algorithm
3 are easily simulated; for all but the nal iteration it returns false, in the nal
iteration it returns true. Applying the composition theorem shows that within the
dened bounds the k-means algorithm is secure.
3.3.4 Handling Collusion
Parties P1, and Pr have more information than the others during the execution
of the above algorithm. Specically, P1 knows
1. the permutation , and
2. the values of the random splits (i.e., the random matrix Vkr).
Pr learns
1. the permuted result vectors of the permutation algorithm (~ Ti) for all the parties
other than P2, and
2. the comparison results.
(Note that P2 also learns the comparison results.) While we have proven that this
information is meaningless in isolation, collusion between P1 and Pr provides enough45
information to derive the distances between each point and each party's means. It
is necessary to carefully select these two parties so that all parties are condent the
two will not collude.
The assumption of non-collusion is often implicitly made in the real world. For
example, take the case of lawyers for parties on opposite sides in court. While no
technical means prevent collusion, safeguards exist in the form of severe punishments
for breaking this rule as well as the business penalty of lost reputation. Similar legal
and reputation safeguards could be enforced for privacy-preserving data mining. In
addition, if there were not at least two parties who did not want to share information,
there would be no need for a secure algorithm. Since collusion between P1 and Pr
reveals P1's information to Pr, P1 would be unlikely to collude simply out of self-
interest.
However, technical solutions are more satisfying. Let p, 1  p  r   1, be a
user dened anti-collusion security parameter. We present a modication of the
algorithm that guarantees that at least p + 1 parties need to collude to disclose
additional information. The problem is in Algorithm 4. The key idea is that stage 1
is run p times, each time selecting a new party to act as P1. Thus, the permutation
 and the random matrix Vkr is dierent for every run, however the row sum of
each V matrix is ~ 0, so the total sum is still the actual distance. In stage 4, to get the
true index from the permuted index, the p parties apply their inverse permutations
in order. Thus, the true index is 
 1
1 (
 1
2 (:::( 1
p (i0)):::)).
3.3.5 Communication Analysis
We give a bottom-up analysis of the communication cost of one iteration of the
algorithm. The total cost is dependent on the number of iterations required to
converge, which is dependent on the data. Assume r parties, n data elements, and
that encrypted distances can be represented in m bits.46
The permutation algorithm requires only two rounds of communication. For
length-n vectors, the total bit cost is 2n  m + public key size = O(n) bits.
The secure add and compare algorithm is a two party protocol, implemented us-
ing secure circuit evaluation. There are several general techniques for implementing
circuit evaluation that optimize dierent parameters such as computation cost, com-
munication cost (number of rounds or total number of bits), etc. The basic tool used,
one out of two oblivious transfer, can also be implemented in several ways. Methods
exist that require a constant number of rounds of communication (by parallelizing
the oblivious transfers) with bit communication cost linear in the number of gates
in the circuit. An excellent survey is given in [36]. The secure add and compare
algorithm requires two addition circuits and one comparison circuit, all of m = logn
bits (where n is based on the resolution of the distance). For both addition and
comparison the number of gates required is linear in m. Therefore this step requires
constant rounds and O(m) bits of communication.
In Algorithm 4, closest cluster, there are several places where communication
occurs. Steps 4   5 make r   1 calls to the permutation algorithm with size k
vectors. Steps 10   11 require r   2 rounds of communication and (r   2)  k  m
bits. Steps 17   18 use k   1 calls to the secure add and compare algorithm. Steps
24 25 require two rounds and O(rlogk) bit cost. Thus the total cost is 2(r   1)+
r  2+(k  1)const  3r +constk = O(r +k) rounds and 2k m(r  1)+k 
m  (r   2) + (k   1)  const  (logn)  3  m  kr + kclogn = O(kr) bits.
The collusion resistant variant of Section 3.3.4 multiplies the cost of steps 4   5
and step 24 by a factor of p. This gives O(pr + k) rounds and O(pkr) bits.
We now give a communication analysis of Algorithm 3. Step 10 involves r   1
rounds of communication, with bit cost (r   1)  m. Step 14 makes one call to
secure add and compare, for constant rounds and O(m) bits. Thus, the total cost
is O(r) rounds and O(rm) bits.
Finally, we come to the analysis of the entire algorithm. We do not count any
setup needed to decide the ordering or role of the parties. One iteration of the k-47
means algorithm requires one call to the closest cluster computation for every, point
and one call to the checkThreshold algorithm. Since all points can be processed in
parallel, the total number of rounds required is O(r + k). The bit communication
cost is O(nrk).
Optimizations The cost of secure comparisons in Stage 3 of Algorithm 4 can be
eliminated with a security compromise that would often be innocuous. First, the
random vector generated in step 2 is generated so the rows sum to randomly chosen
r instead of 0. In Stage 2, all the parties (including P2) send their permuted vectors
to Pr. Now Pr can independently nd the index of the row with the minimum row
sum. Thus, the communication cost is 2(r   1) + r   1 + 2  3r = O(r) rounds and
2k  m  (r   1) + k  m  (r   1) + 2(logk)  3krm bits.
The problem with this approach is that Pr learns the relative distance of a point
to each cluster, i.e., it learns that p is 15 units farther from the second nearest cluster
than from the cluster it belongs to. It does not know which cluster the second nearest
is. Eectively it gets k equations (one for each cluster) in k + 1 unknowns. (The
unknowns are the location of the point, the location of all clusters but the one it
belongs in, and the distance to the closest cluster center.) Since the permutation of
clusters is dierent for each point, as is the random R, combining information from
multiples points still does not enable solving to nd the exact location of a point
or cluster. However, probabilistic estimates on the locations of points/clusters are
possible. If the parties are willing to accept this loss of security in exchange for the
communication eciency, they can easily do so.
Let us now compare our communication cost with that of the general circuit
evaluation method. For one iteration of the algorithm a circuit evaluation would
be required for each point to evaluate the cluster to which the point is assigned.
Even with an optimized circuit the closest cluster computation requires at least
r   1 addition blocks for each cluster, i.e., approx. kr addition circuits, and k   1
comparison blocks. These blocks are all of width at least m bits. The best known48
general method still requires at least r2 bits of communication for every circuit.
Thus, a lower bound on the amount of bits transferred is O(kmr3) bits.
A simple upper bound on non-secure distributed k-means is obtained by having
every party send its data to one site. This gives O(n) bits in one round. Privacy is
adding a factor of O(r + k) rounds and O(rk) bit communication cost. While this
tradeo may seem expensive, if the alternative is not to perform data mining at all,
it seems quite reasonable.
Clustering in the presence of diering scales, variability, correlation and/or out-
liers can lead to unintuitive results if an inappropriate space is used. Research has
developed robust space transformations that permit good clustering in the face of
such problems [55]. Such estimators need to be calculated over the entire data.
An important extension to our work would be to allow privacy preserving compu-
tation of such estimators, giving higher condence in clustering results. Similarly,
extending this work to the more robust EM-clustering algorithm [25,61] under the
heterogeneous database model is a promising future direction. Another problem is
to nd the set of common entities without revealing the identity of entities that are
not common to all parties.
3.4 Na ve Bayes Classication
Privacy-preserving classication on vertically partitioned data has many real-
world applications. For example, assume a medical research study wants to compare
medical outcomes based on techniques in pharmaceutical manufacturing processes
(e.g., to answer the question \are generic drugs really as eective as brand-name",
and more important, what manufacturing processes produce the best results?) The
insurance companies can't disclose individual patient data without permission [45],
and complete manufacturing processes are trade secrets (although individual tech-
niques may be commonly known.) Similar constraints arise in many applications; Eu-
ropean Community legal restrictions apply to disclosure of any individual data [30].49
Na ve Bayes is a simple but highly eective classier. This combination of sim-
plicity and eectiveness has lead to its use as a baseline standard by which other
classiers are measured. With various enhancements it is highly eective, and re-
ceives practical use in many applications (e.g., text classication [63]).
3.4.1 Na ve Bayes Classier
method. The following description of a Na ve Bayes classier is based on the
discussion in Mitchell [63]. The Na ve Bayes classier applies to learning tasks where
each instance x is described by a conjunction of attribute values and the target
function f(x) can take on any value from some nite set V . A set of training examples
of the target function is provided, and a new instance is presented, described by the
tuple of attribute values < a1;a2;:::;an >. The learner is asked to predict the target
value, or classication, for this new instance.
The Bayesian approach to classifying the new instance is to assign the most prob-
able target value, vMAP, given the attribute values < a1;a2;:::;an > that describe
the instance.
vMAP = argmax
vj2V
(P(vjja1;a2;:::;an)) (3.1)
Using Bayes theorem,
vMAP = argmax
vj2V
 
P(a1;a2;:::;anjvj)P(vj)
P(a1;a2;:::;an)
!
= argmax
vj2V
(P(a1;a2;:::;anjvj)P(vj)) (3.2)
The Na ve Bayes classier makes the further simplifying assumption that the
attribute values are conditionally independent given the target value. Therefore,
vNB = argmax
vj2V
 
P(vj)
Y
i
P(aijvj)
!
(3.3)
where vNB denotes the target value output by the Na ve Bayes classier.
The conditional probabilities P(aijvj) need to be estimated from the training
set. The prior probabilities P(vj) also need to be xed in some fashion (typically by50
simply counting the frequencies from the training set). The probabilities for diering
hypotheses can be computed by normalizing the values received for each hypothesis.
Probabilities are computed dierently for nominal and numeric attributes.
Nominal Attributes
For a nominal attribute X with r possible attributes values x1;:::;xr, the proba-
bility P(X = xkjvj) =
nj
n where n is the total number of training examples for which
V = vj, and nj is the number of those training examples that also have X = xk.
Numeric Attributes
In the simplest case, numeric attributes are assumed to have a \normal" or
\Gaussian" probability distribution. The probability density function for a normal
distribution with mean  and variance 2 is given by
f(x) =
1
p
2
e
 
(x )2
22 (3.4)
The mean  and variance 2 are calculated for each class and each numeric attribute
from the training set. Now the required probability that the instance is of the class
vj, P(X = x0jvj), can be estimated by substituting x = x0 in equation 3.4.
3.4.2 Model Issues { Splitting of Model Parameters
Since dierent sites hold dierent attributes, one issue of particular interest with
classication is the location and security properties of the class attribute. We can
divide this into two possibilities:
 All the parties hold the (common/public) class attribute, or
 Only a subset of the parties have the (secret) class attribute.
The rst case is the simplest, assuming that the class attribute of the training data
is known to all parties. In some cases this is reasonable { e.g., manufacturers of51
subcomponents collaborating to determine expected failure rates of fully assembled
systems based on attributes of the subcomponents. In this case, it is easy to estimate
all the required counts for nominal attributes and means and variances for numeric
attributes locally, causing no privacy breaches. Prediction can be accomplished by
independently estimating the probabilities, and securely multiplying and comparing
to obtain the predicted class.
More interesting is the general case, where not all parties have the class attribute.
We can simplify this to the basic case where one party has the class attribute and the
other has the remaining attributes. Solving this enables us to solve any distribution
of attributes. (Extension to more than two parties, or where the party with the class
attribute has more information, is straightforward.)
It is also necessary that the model learned not reveal information { the model
parameters (probability distribution of classes) would reveal information about the
(protected) class values. Instead, we build a model where each party has random
shares of the model, and collaborate to classify an instance. The only knowledge
gained by either side is the class of each instance classied.
The obvious alternative, generating and sharing the classier, reveals considerable
information about both the attributes and the classes. The relative distribution
of classes in the training data is likely to be sensitive, as is the mean/variance or
distribution of the attribute values. With our approach, neither party learns anything
new until a new instance is classied, and then the only thing learned is the predicted
class of that instance. While learning the predicted class of enough instances may
allow reverse-engineering the classier, this is unavoidable given that the goal is to
learn the classes of the test data. In addition, if either party feels too much is being
revealed, they can simply dispose of their share of the classier to ensure no more
of their information is disclosed. Also, it is possible to use the protocols developed
such that the class of each instance is learned only by the party holding the class
attribute (nothing is learned by the remaining parties). In some cases, this might be
preferable.52
Having both parties (the data site and the class site) hold shares of all the model
parameters complicates the evaluation of a new instance. Classifying a new instance
is no longer a straightforward task and a joint protocol is required to classify any
new instance. The method to do this is given in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.3 Building the Classier Model
The basic idea behind our protocol is that each party ends up with shares of the
conditionally independent probabilities that constitute the parameters of a Na ve
Bayes classier. By themselves, the shares appear random { only when added do
they have meaning. This addition only occurs as part of evaluating the classier on
an instance { and the protocol that does this reveals only the class of the instance.
We start with computing the shares of the parameters. For nominal attributes,
the parameters are P(xijvl) = ni=n for each class i and attribute value l. For Numeric
attributes, we need the mean and variance for the probability density function given
in Equation 3.4.
Nominal Attributes
Party Pd holds the nominal attribute D, while party Pc holds the class attribute
C. D has r possible values, a1;:::;ar. C has k possible class values v1;:::;vk. The
goal is to compute r  k matrices Sc;Sd where the sum of corresponding entries
sc
li + sd
li gives the probability estimate for class vi given that the attribute has value
al.
The key idea is that to compute a given entry sli, Pd constructs a binary vector
corresponding to the entities in the training set with 1 for each item having the value
al and 0 for other items. Pc constructs a similar vector with 1=ni for the ni entities
in the class, and 0 for other entities. The scalar product of the vectors gives the
appropriate probability for the entry.53
Require: Nominal attribute D, Class attribute C
Require: n transactions, r attribute values, k class values
Require: Const (eld size / precision)
Ensure: r k share matrices Sc;Sd where S = Sc +Sd gives the probability values
for each class/attribute
1: for i = 1:::k fFor each class valueg do
2: fPc generates the vector ~ Y from C:g
3: for j = 1:::n do
4: if cj = vi then
5: yj   bConst=nic fClass value is vig
6: else
7: yj   0
8: end if
9: end for
10: for l = 1:::r fFor each attribute valueg do
11: fPd generates the vector ~ X from D:g
12: for j = 1:::n do
13: if dj = al then
14: xj   1 fAttribute value is alg
15: else
16: xj   0
17: end if
18: end for
19: sc
li;sd
li   ~ X  ~ Y computed using a secure scalar product protocol (Section
A.1.2)
20: end for
21: end for
Algorithm 6: Computing shares of all probabilities54
Algorithm 6 denes the protocol to compute the shares of these renormalized
ratios (probabilities) in detail. To accomplish the security proof, calculations must
occur over a closed eld; as a result values are premultiplied by a constant and trun-
cated to integral values. To achieve full precision, this constant should be a multiple
of the least common multiple of n1;:::;nk, however sharing this would reveal private
information about the distribution of classes. (n! would be an acceptable multiple
that would not reveal class distributions, but is computationally intractable). In
practice, using n on the order of word size (e.g., 264) will give reasonable precision
and computational cost. To simplify presentation, we will speak of \probability"
when the algorithm in fact computes C  probability.
Numeric Attributes
For numeric attributes, computing the probability requires knowing the mean 
and variance 2 for each class value.
Computing the mean is similar to the preceding algorithm { for each class, Pc
builds a vector of 1=ni and 0 depending on whether the training entity is in the
class or not, and the mean for the class is the scalar product of this vector with
the projection of the data onto the attribute. The scalar product gives each party
a share of the result, such that the sum is the mean (actually a constant times the
mean, to convert to an integral value.) The result is a length k vector of the shares
of the means.
Computing the variances 2
1;:::;2
k is more dicult, as it requires summing the
square of the distances between values and the mean, without revealing values to
Pc or classes to Pd, or means to either. This is accomplished with homomorphic
encryption: E(a+b) = E(a)E(b). Algorithm 7 describes this process in detail, we
highlight some of the more confusing areas here.55
Require: n data items, k class values, precision/eld size Const
Require: Pd has data vector ~ D, Pc has class vector ~ C
1: fCompute the mean:g
2: for i = 1:::k do
3: for j = 1:::n do
4: if cj = vi then
5: yj   bConst=nic fClass value is vig
6: else
7: yj   0
8: end if
9: end for
10: 0
i;00
i   ~ D  ~ Y fComputed with secure scalar product.g
11: fshares 0
i + 00
i = Const  i, where i is the mean for class ig
12: end for
13:
14: fCompute the varianceg
15: Pd: generate a homomorphic public key encryption pair Ek;Dk
16: for j = 1:::n do
17: de
j   Ek(Const  dj)
18: end for
19: for i = 1:::k do
20: me
i   Ek(0
i)
21: end for
22: Pd sends ~ De; ~ Me, and Ek to Pc
23: Pc: generate the vectors ~ Z and ~ X:
24: for j = 1:::n do
25: Generate random rj
26: zj   y0
j=(mcj  Ek(00
cj + rj))
27: f= Ek(Const  dj   0
cj   00
cj   rj)g
28: f= Ek(Const  (dj   cj)   rj)g
29: end for
30: Pc sends ~ Z to Pd
31: Pd decrypts all the transactions in ~ Z to get ~ W (i.e., wj   Dk(Ek(Const  (dj   l) +
rj)) = Const  (dj   l) + rj)
32:
33: for j = 1:::n do
34: Shares t0
j;t00
j   (rj + wj)2 using the protocol in Section A.1.3
35: end for
36: for i = 1:::k do
37: f~ Y is vector for class k as generated in steps 1-5g
38: Compute shares temp;00
j where temp + 00
j = ~ T00  ~ Y
39: Pc : 00
j   ~ T  ~ Y + temp
40: fNote 0
j + 00
j = Const3  ( 1
nj  (
P
j(dj   j)2))g
41: end for
Algorithm 7: Computing Mean and Variance56
In lines 15-22, Pd computes encrypted vectors of the data values and its share
of the means and sends them to Pc, along with the encryption (but not decryption)
key.
In the next phase (lines 23-31), Pc takes the data values and subtracts the means
(both its share and the share sent by Pd) to get the distance needed to compute the
variance. Pc also subtracts a random value, keeping the random value as its share of
the distances. Homomorphic encryption makes this possible without decrypting. Pc
sends the vector back to Pd, which decrypts to get the distance plus a random value.
Next, the parties engage in a square computation protocol (Section A.1.3) to
compute shares t0
j;t00
j of the square of the sum of Pc's randoms rj and the decrypted
distance. The scalar product of Pd's share vector and the class vector ~ Y is taken,
giving two shares. To its share, Pc adds the scalar product of its vector of randoms
and ~ Y . This gives each party a share of 2 multiplied by the probability of an item
appearing in the class (again scaled to an integral value, in this case by the cube of
the chosen constant.)
The scalar product and square computation subroutines are based on previous
work, and are discussed in Section A.1.
3.4.4 Evaluation of an Instance
A new instance is classied according to Equation 3.3. Since both y = x2 and
y = lnx are monotonically increasing functions, squaring and taking the natural log
still preserves the correctness of the argmax. Thus the equation can be rewritten as
follows:
vNB = argmax
vj2V
 
P(vj)
Y
i
P(aijvj)
!
= argmax
vj2V
0
@ln
 
P(vj)
Y
i
P(aijvj)
!21
A57
= argmax
vj2V
 
(2  lnP(vj)) +
X
i
ln

P(aijvj)
2

!
= argmax
vj2V
0
B
@
C + (2  lnP(vj))+
P
i ln(P(aijvj)2)
1
C
A (3.5)
where the constant C is determined by the number and composition of the nominal
attributes. If there are l nominal attributes, C = Const1  :::  Constl where each
Consti is contributed by one nominal attribute due to the fact that the nominal
probabilities are multiplied with a constant. By taking the logarithm, the constant
multiplicative factor is converted to a constant additive factor.
For a nominal attribute,
ln

P(aijvj)
2

= ln(
nj
n
)
2 = 2ln(p
0 + p
00)
We have already shown how to compute p0 and p00 in Section 3.4.3. The parties
can computes shares of the ln function securely using the secure ln method developed
by Lindell and Pinkas, outlined later in Section A.1.4. Finally, they can multiply
their shares by 2 to generate the necessary shares.
For a numeric attribute,
ln

P(aijvj)
2

= ln
 1
22e
 
(x )2
2

=  ln(2
2)  
(x   )2
2
=  ln(2)   ln(
2)  
(x   )2
2 (3.6)
ln(2) is publicly computable, but it does not even need to be computed since
it is a constant that does not aect comparison. Shares of 2 are present with both
parties. Shares of ln(2) can again be computed using the method discussed in
Section A.1.4. Shares of (x   )2 can be computed using the square computation
method given in Section A.1.3. Finally, shares of (x 2)=2 can be computed using
the division protocol described in Section A.1.5. Thus, for every class value, for
each attribute, the shares of the required values are present with the party owning
the attribute and the party owning the class attribute. Now, evaluating equation58
3.5 reduces to a simple circuit evaluation. The required circuit adds up all of the
shares for each attribute for each class value and outputs the name of the class with
the maximum such value. This circuit is similar to the Secure Add and Compare
circuit used in Section 4.5 except that it is extended to multiple attributes.
The Taylor series expansion is a bounded approximation to the real value. How-
ever, the result class of the algorithm can only be wrong if the true Na ve Bayes
probability estimate of the correct class and the incorrect result are within some 
(increasing the number of steps in the Taylor series expansions, and thus the com-
munication cost, allows the choice of  to be arbitrarily small). If the correct class
and the class returned are this close, then the \incorrect" result is nearly as good an
answer as the best result, and likely to be adequate in practice.
3.4.5 Security Analysis
We now give a proof of security for protocols of Section 3.4.3, assuming security
of the sub-blocks used, and applying the composition theorem of [39] described in
Section 2.3. We start with a lemma that share splitting does in fact preserve privacy.
Lemma 3.4.1 If a function y = f(x1 +x2) is evaluated over a nite eld F, where
the inputs x1 and x2 are shares known to two dierent parties and the output y is also
split into shares, where the share y1 is chosen randomly from an uniform distribution
over the eld F and y2 = y   y1, then both parties can independently simulate their
share yi.
Proof. First, we need to prove that P(y2 = a) =
1
jFj.
P(y2 = a) = P(y   y1 = a)
= P(y1 = y   a)
=
1
jFj59
This is equivalent to choosing y2 from an uniform distribution over the eld
F. Note that though the joint distribution of y1;y2 is not necessarily uniform,
independently both y1 and y2 can be simulated using a uniform distribution.
Theorem 3.4.2 Algorithm 6 privately computes the shares of all the probabilities.
Proof. The only communication occurs at line 19 with the invocation of the
scalar product protocol. The results of the scalar product protocol are random
shares, which can be simulated as shown in Lemma 3.4.1. Protocol 6 can thus be
simulated, with the composition theorem 2.3.1 being applied to the scalar product
protocol.
Theorem 3.4.3 Algorithm 7 privately computes the shares of the means and vari-
ances.
Proof. Communication occurs only at lines 10;22;30;34;38. We prove the pro-
tocol secure by providing a simulator for both parties Pc and Pd. The simulator for
both Pc and Pd proceeds simply by executing the actual protocol. In order to show
that the view of each party can be simulated, we only need to simulate the messages
received by each party.
At line 10, the results of the scalar product protocol are random shares, which
can be simulated by both Pc and Pd as shown in Lemma 3.4.1.
At line 22, Pc simulates the message received by Pc generating a key pair and
using the generated encryption key for Ek. It also generates a n random numbers to
comprise ~ De and k random numbers to form ~ Me. Assuming security of encryption,
these are computationally indistinguishable from the true vectors and encryption
key.
To simulate the message received by Pd at line 30, Pd chooses n random numbers
from an uniform distribution over the eld F and encrypts these numbers with
its key Ek to form the vector ~ Z. Note that each zj simulates the encryption of60
Const  (dj   cj)   rj. Since the operations are over a nite eld F and the rj is
also uniformly chosen over the nite eld F,
P(Dk(zj) = x) = P(Const  (dj   cj)   rj = x)
= P(rj = Const  (dj   cj)   x)
=
1
jFj
Thus simulating the value is possible by choosing a random number from an uniform
distribution over F and encrypting this random with the encryption key Ek.
At line 34, the results of the square computation are random shares, which can
be simulated by both Pc and Pd as shown in Lemma 3.4.1.
At line 38, the results of the scalar product protocol are random shares, which
can be simulated by both Pc and Pd as shown in Lemma 3.4.1.
Note that the scalar product in line 39 is a completely local computation by Pc
and thus does not need to be simulated by Pd. Protocol 7 can thus be simulated,
with the composition theorem 2.3.1 being applied to the scalar product protocol at
lines 10 and 38 and to the square computation protocol at line 34.
Theorem 3.4.4 The evaluation protocol in Section 3.4.4 privately computes the
class.
Proof. For nominal attributes, the shares of the probabilities are present with
both the parties to begin with. The secure ln computation returns random shares
to both the parties. By Lemma 3.4.1, these shares can be independently simulated
by both the parties.
Similarly, for numeric attributes, the shares of the means and variances are
present with both the parties. The secure ln computation returns random shares
of the variance to both the parties. By Lemma 3.4.1, these shares can be indepen-
dently simulated by both the parties. The shares of (x   )2 are computed by a
call to the secure square computation protocol. Since this protocol also computes
random shares, by Lemma 3.4.1, these shares can be independently simulated by
both the parties. Finally, the shares of (x   )2=2 are computed by an invocation61
of the division protocol which also computes random shares. Therefore by Lemma
3.4.1 these shares can also be independently simulated by both the parties.
The addition and comparison circuit is a generic circuit and thus has been proven
secure by [40]. The result is simply the output class, and is simulated exactly as
the nal result is presumed known by the simulator. Applying Theorem 2.3.1 to the
secure ln computation, protocol 6, protocol 7 and square computation protocol, the
evaluation protocol is also secure.
3.4.6 Computation and Communication Analysis
For the purpose of this analysis, the number of distinct class values is assumed
to be k. For a nominal attribute with r attribute values, the scalar product protocol
is called a total of r  k times over n-dimensional vectors. Thus depending on the
cost of the scalar product (which is typically linear in n), the cost of protocol 6 is
O(rkn). For small values of r;k this is feasible, though for large values it may be
quite inecient. A mitigating factor is that if r;k are large relative to the size of the
training set n, Na ve Bayes is probably not a good classier to use anyway.
For numeric attributes, to compute the shares of the means requires k invocations
of the scalar product protocol. To compute the variance, at line 22 Pd sends two
n-dimensional vectors to Pc. At line 30, Pc sends one n-dimensional vector to Pd.
Line 34 involves n invocations of the square computation protocol. Since the square
computation protocol consists of one polynomial evaluation for a polynomial of de-
gree 2, the communication cost of n invocations of the square computation require
only linear (O(n)) communication cost where the constant is quite small. Finally,
line 38 again involves k invocations of the scalar product protocol. Thus the total
communication cost is clearly linear in n (O(n)), where the constant is of the degree
of k. Thus the cost for numeric attributes is signicantly lower than for nominal
attributes.62
Selecting the parameters is done o-line, while classication of a new instance can
be considered \online", and is done one instance at a time. Evaluation requires one
call to the secure ln protocol for every nominal attribute and one call to the secure
ln protocol, one call to the square computation protocol and one call to the division
protocol for every numeric attribute. Finally, it also requires one call to the generic
addition and comparison circuit to nd the class having the maximum. Secure ln
computation requires running Yao's protocol on a circuit that is linear in the size
of the inputs followed by the private evaluation of a polynomial of degree k0 over
the eld F. The value of this k0 is user decidable depending on the accuracy / cost
tradeo. The total communication cost is dominated by the circuit evaluation and
thus is O(k0 logjFjjSj) bits where jSj is the length of the key for a pseudo-random
function.
The cost of square computation protocol is insignicant (since it is a constant).
Similarly, the division protocol requires only two scalar products of vectors of con-
stant size (2 and 3). The cost for a numeric attribute is dominated by the secure ln
protocol.
The single generic circuit required to nd the class with the maximum value
requires a total of k comparison circuits built on top of q addition circuits, where q
is the total number of attributes. The cost of this is linear in q +k. Thus for a total
of q attributes, the total cost of a single evaluation is O(qk0 logjFj  jSj) bits.
3.5 Decision Tree Classication
Decision Tree Classiers are used eectively in a multitude of dierent areas:
radar signal classication, character recognition, remote sensing, medical diagnosis,
expert systems, and speech recognition, to name a few. One of the most important
features of decision tree classiers is their ability to break down a complex decision
making process into a collection of simpler decisions, thus providing a solution which
is often easier to interpret. We look at the seminal ID3 [76] classication algorithm.63
While the problem has been addressed earlier [28], the prior solution is limited to
two parties and also requires that both parties have the class attribute. We present
a completely general solution to the problem. The method presented here works for
any number of parties, and the class attribute (or other attributes) need be known
only to one party.
Privacy preservation can mean many things: Protecting specic individual values,
breaking the link between values and the individual they apply to, protecting source,
etc. Here, we aim for a high standard of privacy: Not only individual entities
are protected, but to the extent feasible even the schema (attributes and possible
attribute values) are protected from disclosure. The goal is that each site need
disclose as little as possible, while still constructing a valid tree in a time suitable
for practical application.
To this end, all that is revealed is the basic structure of the tree (e.g., the number
of branches at each node, corresponding to the number of distinct values for an
attribute; the depth of each subtree) and which site is responsible for the decision
made at each node (i.e., which site possesses the attribute used to make the decision,
but not what attribute is used, or even what attributes the site possesses.) This
allows for ecient use of the tree to classify an object; otherwise using the tree would
require a complex cryptographic protocol involving every party at every possible level
to evaluate the class of an object without revealing who holds the attribute used at
that level.
Each site also learns the count of classes at some interior nodes (although only
the class site knows the mapping to actual classes { other sites don't even know
if a class with 30% distribution at one node is the same class as one with a 60%
distribution at a lower node, except to the extent that this can be deduced from
the tree and it's own attributes.) At the leaf nodes, this is desirable: one often
wants probability estimates, not simply a predicted class. As knowing the count of
transactions at each leaf node would enable computing distributions throughout the
tree anyway, this really doesn't disclose much new information.64
Require: R, the set of attributes
Require: C, the class attribute
Require: T, the set of transactions
1: if R is empty then
2: return a leaf node, with class value assigned to most transactions in T
3: else if all transactions in T have the same class c then
4: return a leaf node with the class c
5: else
6: Determine the attribute A that best classies the transactions in T
7: Let a1;:::;am be the values of attribute A. Partition T into the m partitions
T(a1);:::;T(am) such that every transaction in T(ai) has the attribute value
ai.
8: Return a tree whose root is labeled A (this is the test attribute) and has m
edges labeled a1;:::;am such that for every i, the edge ai goes to the tree
ID3(R   A;C;T(ai)).
9: end if
Algorithm 8: ID3(R,C,T) tree learning algorithm
3.5.1 Privacy-Preserving ID3: Creating the Tree
The basic ID3 algorithm is given in Algorithm 8. We will introduce our dis-
tributed privacy-preserving version by running through this algorithm, describing
pieces as appropriate. We then give the full algorithm in Algorithm 14. Note that
for our distributed algorithm, no site knows R, instead each site i knows its own
attributes Ri. Only one site knows the class attribute C. In vertical partitioning,
every site knows a projection of the transactions RiT. Each projection includes a
transaction identier that serves as a join key.
We rst check if R is empty. This is based on Secure Sum [50,84], and is given
in Algorithm 9. The idea is that the rst party adds a random r to its count of
remaining items. This is passed to all sites, each adding its count. The last site65
Require: k sites Pi (the site calling the function is P1; any other site can be Pk),
each with a ag AttRemi = 0 if no remaining attributes, AttRemi = 1 if Pi has
attributes remaining.
Require: a commutative encryption function E with domain size m > k.
1: P1 chooses a random integer r uniformly from 0:::m   1.
2: P1 sends r + AttRemi to P2
3: for i = 2::k   1 do
4: Site Pi receives r0 from Pi 1.
5: Pi sends r0 + AttRemi mod m to Pi+1
6: end for
7: Site Pk receives r0 from Pk 1.
8: r0   r0 + AttRemi mod m
9: P1 and Pk create secure keyed commutative hash keys E1 and Ek fSee Section
4.1 for discussion of commutative hash.g
10: P1 sends E1(r) to Pk
11: Pk receives E1(r) and sends Ek(E1(r)) and Ek(r0) to P1
12: P1 returns E1(Ek(r0)) = Ek(E1(r)) f, r0 = r ,
Pk
j=1 AttRemi = 0 , no
attributes remain g
Algorithm 9: IsREmpty(): Are any attributes left?66
? warm ? ? high 5
A6 A5 A4 A3 A2 A1
Figure 3.5. A constraint tuple for a single site
and rst then use commutative encryption to compare the nal value to r (without
revealing either) { if they are the same, R is empty.
Line 2 requires determining the majority class for a node, when only one site
knows the class. This is accomplished with a protocol for securely determining the
cardinality of set intersection, given in Section 4.1. Each site determines which of
its transactions might reach that node of the tree. The intersection of these sets
with the transactions in a particular class gives the number of transactions that
reach that point in the tree, enabling the class site to determine the distribution and
majority class; it returns a (leaf) node identier that allows it to map back to this
distribution.
To formalize this, we introduce the notion of a Constraint Set. As the tree is
being built, each party i keeps track of the values of its attributes used to reach
that point in the tree in a lter Constraintsi. Initially, this is all don't care values
(`?'). However, when an attribute Aij at site i is used (lines 6-7 of id3), entry j in
Constraintsi is set to the appropriate value before recursing to build the subtree. An
example is given in Figure 3.5. The site has 6 attributes A1;:::;A6. The constraint
tuple shows that the only transactions valid for this transaction are those with a
value of 5 for A1, high for A2, and warm for A5. The other attributes have a value
of ? since they do not factor into the selection of an instance.
Formally, we dene the following functions:
Constraints.set(attr;val): Set the value of attribute attr to val in the local con-
straints set. The special value `?' signies a don't-care condition.67
satises: x satises Constraintsi if and only if the attribute values of the instance
are compatible with the constraint tuple: 8i;(Ai(x) = v , Constraints(Ai) =
v) _ Constraints(Ai) = `?'.
FormTransSet:
Function FormTransSet(Constraints): Return local transactions meeting all
of the constraints
1: Y = ;
2: for all transaction id i 2 T do
3: if ti satises Constraints then
4: Y   Y [ fig
5: end if
6: end for
7: return Y
We can now determine the majority class (and distribution of classes) by computing
for each class
T
i=1::k Yi, where Yk includes a constraint on the class value. This is
given in Algorithm 10.
The next issue is determining if all transactions have the same class (Algorithm
8 line 3). Note that if they are not all the same class, we don't want to disclose any
more than necessary. For eciency, we do allow the class site to learn the count of
classes even if this is an interior node; since it could compute this from the counts
at the leaves of the subtree below the node, this discloses no additional information.
Algorithm 11 gives the details, it uses constraint sets and secure cardinality of set
intersection in basically the manner describe above for computing the majority class
at a leaf node. If all transactions are in the same class, we construct a leaf node.
The class site maintains a mapping from the ID of that node to the resulting class
distribution68
Require: k sites Pi with local constraint sets Constraintsi
1: for all sites Pi except Pk do
2: at Pi: Yi   FormTransSet(Constraintsi)
3: end for
4: for each class c1;:::;cp do
5: at Pk: Constraintsk:set(C;ci) fTo include the class restrictiong
6: at Pk: Yk   FormTransSet(Constraintsk)
7: cnti   jY1 \ ::: \ Ykj using the cardinality of set intersection protocol (Algo-
rithm 17)
8: end for
9: return (cnt1;:::;cntp)
Algorithm 10: DistributionCounts(): Compute class distribution given current con-
straints
Require: k sites Pi with local constraint sets Constraintsi
1: (cnt1;:::;cntp)   DistributionCounts()
2: if 9j s.t. cntj 6= 0 ^ 8i 6= j, cnti = 0 fonly one of the counts is non-zerog then
3: Build a leaf node with distribution (cnt1;:::;cntp) fActually, 100% class jg
4: return ID of the constructed node
5: else
6: return false
7: end if
Algorithm 11: IsSameClass(): Are all transactions of the same class?69
The next problem is to compute the best attribute: that with the maximum
information gain. If an attribute A is used to partition the data set S, the information
gain can be computed as:
Gain(S;A) = Entropy(S)  
X
v2A
 
jSvj
jSj
 Entropy(Sv)
!
The entropy of a dataset S is given by:
Entropy(S) =  
p X
j=1
Nj
N
log
Nj
N
where Nj is the number of transactions having class cj in S and N is the number of
transactions in S.
As we see, this again becomes a problem of counting transactions: the number of
transactions that reach the node N, the number in each class Nj, and the same two
after partitioning with each possible attribute value v 2 A. Algorithm 13 details the
process of computing these counts; Algorithm 12 captures the overall process.
1: for all sites Pi do
2: bestgaini    1
3: for each attribute Aij at site Pi do
4: gain   ComputeInfoGain(Aij)
5: if gain > bestgaini then
6: bestgaini   gain
7: BestAtti   Aij
8: end if
9: end for
10: end for
11: return argmaxj bestgainj fCould implement using a set of secure comparisonsg
Algorithm 12: AttribMaxInfoGain(): return the site with the attribute having max-
imum information gain
Once the best attribute has been determined, execution proceeds at that site. It
creates an interior node for the split, then recurses.70
1: S   DistributionCounts() fTotal number of transactions at this nodeg
2: InfoGain   Entropy(S)
3: for each attribute value ai do
4: Constraints:set(A;ai) fUpdate local constraints tupleg
5: Sai   DistributionCounts()
6: Infogain   Infogain   Entropy(Sai)  jSaij=jSj fjSj is
Pp
i=1 cntig
7: end for
8: Constraints:set(A;`?') fUpdate local constraints tupleg
9: return InfoGain
Algorithm 13: ComputeInfoGain(A): Compute the Information Gain for attribute
A71
Require: Transaction set T partitioned between sites P1;:::;Pk
Require: p class values, c1;:::;cp, with Pk holding the class attribute
1: if IsREmpty() then
2: Continue at site Pk up to the return:
3: (cnt1;:::;cntp)   DistributionCounts()
4: Build a leaf node with distribution (cnt1;:::;cntp)
5: fclass   argmaxi=1::pcntig
6: return ID of the constructed node
7: else if clsNode   (at Pk :) IsSameClass() then
8: return leaf nodeId clsNode
9: else
10: BestSite   AttribMaxInfoGain()
11: Continue execution at BestSite:
12: Create Interior Node Nd with attribute Nd:A   BestAttBestSite fThis is best
locally (from AttribMaxInfoGain()), and globally from line 8g
13: for each attribute value ai 2 Nd:A do
14: Constraints:set(Nd:A;ai) fUpdate local constraints tupleg
15: nodeId   PPID3() fRecurseg
16: Nd:ai   nodeId fAdd appropriate branch to interior nodeg
17: end for
18: Constraints:set(A;`?') fReturning to parent: should no longer lter transac-
tions with Ag
19: Store Nd locally keyed by Node ID
20: return Node ID of interior node Nd fExecution continues at site owning parent
nodeg
21: end if
Algorithm 14: PPID3(): Privacy-Preserving Distributed ID372
Humidity
Outlook
Sunny Overcast Rain
High Normal Strong Weak
Yes
No Yes
Wind
No Yes
(a) The original tree
Val1 Val2 Val2
Val2 Val3
S1L1
S2L6 S2L2
Val1
Val1
S2L3 S2L7 S2L8 S2L4
S1L5
(b) The privacy preserving tree (Mapping from identiers to attributes
and values is known only at the site holding attributes)
Figure 3.6. The ID3 decision tree on the weather dataset73
3.5.2 Using the Tree
Instance classication proceeds as in the original ID3 algorithm, except that
the nodes (and attributes of the database) are distributed. The site requesting
classication (e.g., a master site) knows the root node of the classication tree. The
basic idea is that control passes from site to site, based on the decision made. Each
site knows the transaction's attribute values for the nodes at its site (and can thus
evaluate the branch), but knows nothing of the other attribute values. The complete
1: fThe start site and ID of the root node is knowng
2: if nodeId is a LeafNode then
3: return class/distribution saved in nodeId
4: else fnodeId is an interior nodeg
5: Nd   local node with id nodeId
6: value   the value of attribute Nd:A for transaction instId
7: childId   Nd:value
8: return childId:Site:classifyInstance(instId;childId) fActually tail recur-
sion: this site need never learn the classg
9: end if
Algorithm 15: classifyInstance(instId, nodeId): returns the class/distribution for the
instance represented by instId
algorithm is given in Algorithm 15, and is reasonably self-explanatory if viewed in
conjunction with Algorithm 14.
We now give a demonstration of how instance classication would actually happen
in this instance for the tree built with the UCI \weather" dataset [13]. Assume two
sites: The weather observatory collects information about relative humidity and
wind, a second collects temperature and cloud cover forecast as well as the class
(\Yes" or \No"). Suppose we wish to know if it is a good day to play tennis. Neither
sites wants to share their forecasts, but are willing to collaborate to oer a \good
tennis day" service. The classication tree is shown in Figure 3.6(b), with S1 and S274
corresponding to the site having information on that node. If today is sunny with
normal humidity, high temperature, and weak wind; classication would proceed as
follows: We know that Site 1 has the root node (we don't need to know anything else).
Site 1 retrieves the attribute for from S1L1: Outlook. Since the classifying attribute
is outlook, and Site 1 knows the forecast is sunny, the token S2L2 is retrieved. This
indicates that the next step is at Site 2. Site 2 is called with the token S2L2, and
retrieves the attribute for S2L2: Humidity. The humidity forecast is normal, so the
token S2L4 is retrieved. Since this token is also present at Site 2, it retrieves the
class value for nodeId S2L4 and returns it: we receive our answer of \Yes".
3.5.3 Security Analysis
We rst analyze the security of the constituent algorithms, then the security of the
complete algorithm. Although it may seem that some of the constituent algorithms
leak a large quantity of information, in the context of the full algorithm the leaked
information can be simulated by knowing the distribution counts at each node, so
overall privacy is maintained.
Lemma 3.5.1 Algorithm 9 reveals nothing to any site except whether the total num-
ber of attributes left is 0.
Proof. The algorithm has two basic phases: The sum (through Pk), and the
comparison between Pk and P1. We start with the sum: simulating the messages
received at lines 2 and 7. The value received by Pi at these steps is
r +
i 1 X
j=1
AttRemj mod m
We will simulate by choosing a random integer uniformly from 0:::m   1 for r0.
We now show that the probability that the simulated r0 = x is the same as the
probability that the messages received in the view = x.
PrfV IEWi = xg = Prfx = r +
i 1 X
j=1
AttRemj mod mg75
= Prfr = x  
i 1 X
j=1
AttRemj mod mg
=
1
m
= PrfSimulatorir
0 = xg
The key to the second and fourth lines is that arithmetic is mod m. r and r0 are
chosen uniformly from 0:::m   1, so the probability of hitting any particular value
in that range is 1=m.
Simulating the message received by Pk at line 11 is simple: Secure encryption
gives messages where the distribution is independent of the key/message, so a selec-
tion from this distribution of possible encrypted messages simulates what Pk receives.
The messages received by P1 are more dicult. The problem is that if r = r0,
Ek(r0) must be such that when encrypted with E1 it is equal to Ek(E1(r)). For this,
the simulator requires the ability to decrypt (as in the set intersection proof). The
simulator computes m = D1(Ek(E1(r)) = Ek(r). If r = r0, this is the message used
to simulate Ek(r0). If not, a random message 6= m is chosen, as in the simulator for
Pk.
Lemma 3.5.2 Algorithm 10 reveals only the count of instances corresponding to all
combinations of constraint sets for each class.
Proof. The only communication occurs at line 7 which consists of a call to Al-
gorithm 17 (Cardinality of Set Intersection). This reveals only the size of the inter-
section set for all subsets of Yi, which are the counts revealed. By application of the
composition theorem (2.3.1), with Algorithm 10 being g and Algorithm 17 being f,
Algorithm 10 is secure.
Lemma 3.5.3 Algorithm 11 nds if all transactions have the same class, revealing
only the class distributions described in Lemma 3.5.2.
Proof. Line 1 is an invocation of Algorithm 10; the security of which has been
discussed. Everything else is computed locally, and can be simulated from the knowl-
edge from Lemma 3.5.2.76
Lemma 3.5.4 Algorithm 13 reveals nothing except the counts S;Sai, and the con-
stituent subcounts described in Lemma 3.5.2 for each attribute value ai and class j,
assuming the number of distinct class values is known.
Proof. The only messages received are at lines 1 and 5, invocations of the
DistributionCounts() function. Applying the composition theorem to these, Al-
gorithm 13 is secure.
Lemma 3.5.5 Algorithm 12 nds the site with the attribute having the maximum
information gain while revealing only the best information gain at each site and the
information discussed in Lemma 3.5.4.
Proof. Communication occurs at lines 4 and 11. Line 4 consists of an invocation
of Algorithm 13. Line 11 is implemented by letting the site compare all the values;
revealing the value of the best information gain at each site. Assuming this is revealed
(part of the input to the simulator), it is trivially simulated. Repeated application
of the composition theorem completes the proof.
Further reduction of the information revealed is possible by using a secure protocol
for nding the maximum among a set of numbers. This would reveal only the site
having the attribute with the maximum information gain and nothing else.
Theorem 3.5.1 Algorithm 14 computes the decision tree while revealing only:
 The distribution subcounts of each node, as described in Lemma 3.5.2. (The full
counts, and some of the subcounts, can be computed knowing the distribution
counts at the leaves.)
 The best information gain from each site at each interior node (as discussed
above, this leak can be reduced.)
Proof. Knowing the nal tree, the simulator at each site can uniquely determine
the sequence of node computations at a site and list the function calls occurring due77
to this. Given this function call list, if the messages received in each function call
can be simulated, the entire algorithm can be proven to be secure.
Line 1 is an invocation of Algorithm 9. The result is simulated as either true or
false depending on whether the node in question is a leaf node in the nal tree or
not.
Line 3 is an invocation of Algorithm 10. The actual counts are given by the
counts in the leaf node, which are known to the site Pk that invoked the algorithm.
The subcounts revealed by Algorithm 10 are presumed known.
Line 7 is an invocation of Algorithm 11. If the node in question is not a leaf node
in the nal tree, the result is false. Otherwise the result is the nodeId of the leaf
node.
Line 10 consists of an invocation of Algorithm 12. The result is actually equal
to the Site which will own the child node. This information is known from the tree
structure. The subcounts and information gain values revealed during this step are
presumed known.
Line 15 is a recursive invocation that returns a node identier; a part of the tree
structure.
Since all of the algorithms mentioned above have been proven secure, applying
the composition theorem, Algorithm 14 is secure. The repeated invocations of the
cardinality of set intersection protocol (Algorithm 17) are valid because in each
invocation, a new set of keys are chosen. This ensures that messages cannot be
correlated across calls.
Theorem 3.5.2 Algorithm 15 reveals nothing other than the leaf node classifying
the instance.
Proof. All the computations are local. The only information passed between
various sites are node identiers. This list of node identiers can be easily simulated
from the classication tree once the nal leaf is known.78
3.5.4 Computation and Communication Analysis
The communication/computation analysis depends on the number of transac-
tions, number of parties, number of attributes, number of attribute values per at-
tribute, number of classes and complexity of the tree. Assume that there are: n
transactions, k parties, c classes, r attributes, p values per attribute (on average),
and q nodes in nal classication tree. We now give a rough analysis of the cost
involved in terms of the number of set intersections required for building the tree
(erring on the conservative side).
At each node in the tree the best classifying attribute needs to be determined.
To do this, the entropy of the node needs to be computed as well as the information
gain per attribute. Computing the entropy of the node requires c set intersections
(1 per class). Computing the gain of one attribute requires cp set intersections
(1 per attribute value and class). Thus, nding the best attribute requires cpr
set intersections. Note that this analysis is rough and assumes that the number
of attributes available at each node remains constant. In actuality, this number
linearly decreases with the depth of the node in the tree (this has little eect on our
analysis). In total, every node requires c(1 + pr) set intersections. Therefore, the
total tree requires cq(1 + pr) set intersections.
The intersection protocol requires that the set of each party be encrypted by
every other party. Since there are k parties, k2 encryptions are required and k2
sets are transferred. Since each set can have at most n transactions, the upper
bound on computation is O(nk2) and the upper bound on communication cost is
also O(nk2  bitsize) bits.
Therefore, in total the entire classication process will require O(cqnk2(1 + pr)
encryptions and cqnk2(1+pr)bitsize bits communication. Note that the encryption
process can be completely parallelized reducing the required time by an order of k.
Once the tree is built, classifying an instance requires no extra overhead, and is
comparable to the original ID3 algorithm.79
3.6 Outlier Detection
In the broadest sense, an outlier is an observation that lies an abnormal distance
from other values in a random sample from a population. This denition leaves it up
to the analyst (or a consensus process) to decide what will be considered abnormal.
Before abnormal observations can be singled out, it is necessary to characterize
normal observations. The goal of outlier detection is to nd all outliers in the input
data.
Outlier detection has wide application; one that has received considerable atten-
tion is the search for terrorism. Detecting previously unknown suspicious behavior
is a clear outlier detection problem. The search for terrorism has also been the
ash point for attacks on data mining by privacy advocates; the U.S. Terrorism
Information Awareness program was killed for this reason [57].
Outlier detection has numerous other applications that also raise privacy con-
cerns. Mining for anomalies has been used for network intrusion detection [10,56];
privacy advocates have responded with research to enhance anonymity [41,79]. Fraud
discovery in the mobile phone industry has also made use of outlier detection [34];
organizations must be careful to avoid overstepping the bounds of privacy legisla-
tion [30]. Privacy-preserving outlier detection will ensure these concerns are bal-
anced, allowing us to get the benets of outlier detection without being thwarted by
legal or technical counter-measures.
We focus specically on Distance Based Outliers. Knorr and Ng [53] dene
the notion of a Distance Based outlier as follows: An object O in a dataset T is a
DB(p,dt)-outlier if at least fraction p of the objects in T lie at distance greater than dt
from O. Other distance based outlier techniques also exist [54,78]. The advantages
of distance based outliers are that no explicit distribution needs to be dened to
determine unusualness, and that it can be applied to any feature space for which
we can dene a distance measure. We assume Euclidean distances, although the
algorithms are easily extended to general Minkowski distances.80
3.6.1 Basic Approach
The problem is to nd distance-based outliers without any party gaining knowl-
edge beyond learning which items are outliers. Ensuring that data is not disclosed
maintains privacy, i.e., no privacy is lost beyond that inherently revealed in know-
ing the outliers. Even knowing which items are outliers need not be revealed to all
parties, further preventing privacy breaches.
The approach duplicates the results of the outlier detection algorithm of [53]. The
idea is that an object o is an outlier if more than a percentage p of the objects in the
data set are farther than distance d from o. The basic idea is that parties compute the
portion of the answer they know, then engage in a secure sum to compute the total
distance. The key is that this total is (randomly) split between sites, so nobody
knows the actual distance. A secure protocol is used to determine if the actual
distance between any two points exceeds the threshold; again the comparison results
are randomly split such that summing the splits (over a closed eld) results in a 1 if
the distance exceeds the threshold, or a 0 otherwise.
For a given object o, each site can now sum all of its shares of comparison results
(again over the closed eld). When added to the sum of shares from other sites,
the result is the correct count; all that remains is to compare it with the percentage
threshold p. This addition/comparison is also done with a secure protocol, revealing
only the result: if o is an outlier.
3.6.2 Algorithm
We now present an algorithm for Distance Based Outliers meeting the denition
given of Knorr and Ng [53]. As discussed earlier, the algorithm is based on the
obvious one: Compare points pairwise and count the number exceeding the distance
threshold. The key is that all intermediate computations (such as distance compar-
isons) leave the results randomly split between the parties involved; only the nal
result (if the count exceeds p%) is disclosed.81
Note that to obtain a secure solution, all operations are carried out modulo some
eld. We will use the eld D for distances, and F for counts of the number of entities.
The eld F must be over twice the number of objects. Limits on D are based on
maximum distances; details on the size are given with each algorithm.
For each object i, the protocol iterates over every other object j. Each party can
compute a share of the pairwise distance locally; the sum of these shares is the total
distance. However, the distance must not be revealed, so a secure protocol is used to
get shares of the pairwise comparison of distance and threshold. A second protocol
allows comparing the shares with the threshold, returning 1 if the distances exceeds
the threshold, or 0 if it does not. The key to this second protocol is that the 1 or
0 is actually two shares m0 and mk 1, such that m0 + mk 1 = 1 (or 0) (mod F).
From one share, a party learns nothing.
These shares are added to the running total kept at parties P0 and Pk 1. Once
all points have been compared, the parties sum their shares. Since the shares add
to 1 for distances exceeding the distance threshold, and 0 otherwise, the total sum
(mod F) is the number of points for which the distance exceeds the threshold. P0 and
Pk 1 nally in a secure protocol that reveals only if the sum of the shares exceeds p%.
This ensures that no party learns anything except whether the point is an outlier.
An interesting side eect of this algorithm is that the parties need not reveal any
information about the attributes they hold, or even the number of attributes. Each
party locally determines the distance threshold for its attributes (or more precisely,
the share of the overall threshold for its attributes). Instead of computing the local
pairwise distance, each party computes the dierence between the local pairwise
distance and the local threshold. If the sum of these dierences is greater than 0,
the pairwise distance exceeds the threshold.
Algorithm 16 gives the full details.
In steps 5{9, the sites sum their local distances. The random x added by P0 masks
the distances from each party. In steps 11{18, Parties P0 and Pk 1 get shares of the
pairwise comparison result. The comparison is a test if the sum is greater than82
Require: k parties, P0;:::;Pk 1; each holds a subset of the attributes for all objects
O.
Require: dtr : local distance threshold for Pr.
Require: Fields D larger than twice the maximum distance, F larger than jOj
1: for all objects oi 2 O do
2: m0
0   m0
k 1   0 (mod F)
3: for all objects oj 2 O;oj 6= oi do
4: P0: Randomly choose a number x from a uniform distribution over the eld
D; x0   x
5: for r   0;:::;k   2 do
6: At Pr: x0   x0 + Distancer(oi;oj)   dtr (mod D) fDistancer is local
distance at Prg
7: Pr sends x0 to Pr+1
8: end for
9: At Pk 1: x0   x0 + Distancek 1(oi;oj)   dtk 1 (mod D)
10: fUsing the secure comparison protocol (Section 4.5)g
11: P0   m0 and Pk 1   mk 1 such that:
12: if 0 < x0 + ( x) (mod D) < jDj=2 then
13: m0 + mk 1 = 1 (mod F)
14: else
15: m0 + mk 1 = 0 (mod F)
16: end if
17: At P0: m0
0   m0
0 + m0 (mod F)
18: At Pk 1: m0
k 1   m0
k 1 + mk 1 (mod F)
19: end for
20: fUsing the secure comparison of Section 4.5g
21: P0   temp0 and Pk 1   tempk 1 such that:
22: if m0
0 + m0
k 1 (mod F) > jOj  p% then
23: temp0 + tempk 1   1 foi is an outlierg
24: else
25: temp0 + tempk 1   0
26: end if
27: P0 and Pk 1 send temp0 and tempk 1 to the party authorized to learn the
result; if temp0 + temp1 = 1 then oi is an outlier.
28: end for
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0 (since the threshold has already been subtracted.) The random split of shares
ensures that nothing is learned by either party. These two parties keep a running
sum of their shares. At the end, in steps 21{26, these shares are added and compared
with the percentage threshold. Both parties get a share of the result. Finally, the
shares are sent to the appropriate party that is authorized to know the result. This
party can sum up the shares and determine if the point is an outlier. Thus, only
that party (e.g., a fraud prevention unit) learns if oi is an outlier, the others learn
nothing.
Theorem 3.6.1 Proof of Correctness: Algorithm 16 correctly returns as output the
complete set of points that are global outliers.
Proof. In order to prove the correctness of Algorithm 16, it is sucient to prove
that a point is reported as an outlier if and only if it is truly an outlier. Consider
point q. If q is an outlier, in steps 12{16 for at least p%jOj+1 of the other points,
m0 + mk 1 = 1 (mod F). Since jFj > jOj, it follows that m0
0 + m0
k 1 > jOj  p%.
Therefore, point q will be correctly reported as an outlier. If q is not an outlier, the
same argument applies in reverse. Thus, in steps 12{16 at most p%jOj 1 points,
m0 + mk 1 = 1 (mod F). Again, since jFj > jOj, it follows that m0
0 + m0
k 1 
jOj  p%. Therefore, point q will not be reported as an outlier.
3.6.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 3.6.2 Algorithm 16 returns as output the set of points that are global
outliers while revealing no other information to any party, provided parties do not
collude.
Proof. All parties know the number (and identity) of objects in O. Thus they
can set up the loops; the simulator just runs the algorithm to generate most of the
simulation. The only communication is at lines 7, 11, 21, and 27.84
Step 7: Each party Ps sees x0 = x+
Ps 1
r=0 Distancer(oi;oj), where x is the random
value chosen by P0. Pr(x0 = y) = Pr(x +
Ps 1
r=0 Distancer(oi;oj) = y) = Pr(x =
y  
Ps 1
r=0 Distancer(oi;oj)) =
1
jDj. Thus we can simulate the value received by
choosing a random value from a uniform distribution over D.
Steps 11 and 21: The simulator for party P0 (respectively Pk 1) again chooses
a number randomly from a uniform distribution, this time over the eld F. By
the same argument as above, the actual values are uniformly distributed, so the
probability of the simulator and the real protocol choosing any particular value
are the same. Since a circuit for secure comparison is used, using the composition
theorem, no additional information is leaked and steps 11 and 21 are secure.
Step 27: Since the nal party knows the results (1 if oi is an outlier, 0 otherwise),
temp0 is simulated by choosing a random value, temp1 = result (1 or 0)  temp0 mod
F. By the same argument on random shares used above, the distribution of simulated
values is indistinguishable from the distribution of the shares.
The simulator clearly runs in polynomial time (the same as the algorithm). Since
each party is able to simulate the view of its execution (i.e., the probability of any
particular value is the same as in a real execution with the same inputs/results) in
polynomial time, the algorithm is secure with respect to Denition 2.3.1.
While the proof is formally only for the semi-honest model, it can be seen that a
malicious party in isolation cannot learn private values (regardless of what it does,
it is still possible to simulate what it sees without knowing the input of the other
parties.) A malicious party can cause incorrect results, but it cannot learn private
data values. Step 7 is particularly sensitive to collusion, but can be improved (at
cost) by splitting the sum into shares and performing several such sums (see [50] for
more discussion of collusion-resistant secure sum).85
3.6.4 Computation and Communication Analysis
Algorithm 16 suers the drawback of having quadratic computation complexity
due to the nested iteration over all objects. While the Knorr and Ng [53] algorithm is
worst-case quadratic, it stops comparing a point to others as soon as it is determined
not to be an outlier. However, such early termination in a secure algorithm would
reveal that the point is close to at least (1   p)%  jDj of the points to which it had
been compared.
Due to the quadratic complexity, Algorithm 16 requires O(n2) secure comparisons
(steps 10-16). While operation parallelism can be used to reduce the round com-
plexity of communication, the key practical issue is the computational complexity of
the encryption required for the secure comparison and scalar product protocols.
When there are three or more parties, assuming no collusion, we can develop
much more ecient solutions that reveal some information. While not completely
secure, the privacy versus cost tradeo may be acceptable in some situations. We
cannot simply ask one party to take the shares and do the comparisons. Since all
of the parties share all of the points, partial knowledge about a point does reveal
useful information to a party. Instead, one of the remaining parties is chosen to play
the part of completely untrusted non-colluding party. With this assumption, a much
more ecient secure comparison algorithm has been postulated by Cachin [16] that
reveals nothing to the third party. The algorithm is otherwise equivalent, but the
cost of the comparisons is reduced substantially.86
4 PRIMITIVES DEVELOPED
This chapter describes building block primitives developed as part of this disser-
tation. Each following section describes a single primitive. Each section typically
consists of 4 subsections {
1. Subsection 1 denes the problem to be solved.
2. Subsection 2 outlines the solution protocol.
3. Subsection 3 analyzes the communication and computation complexity of the
protocol.
4. Subsection 4 provides a security analysis of the protocol.
In a few cases, dierent primitives solve the same problem in a dierent manner.
In these cases, for brevity, the problem denition of the following primitives merely
refers to the problem denition of the rst primitive.
The nal section of the chapter provides a comparative look at the protocols and
discusses possible advantages/disadvantages with using any of them as constituent
protocols in a global algorithm.
4.1 Securely Computing the Size of Set Intersection
The three or more party association rule mining algorithm (Section 3.2) requires
computing the size of the intersection set of local sets. Apart from this, it is an
interesting problem in its own right. Along with our work, there has been other
concurrent work solving this problem [3,37]. Agrawal et. al's solution [3] is similar
to ours except that their solution is limited to two semi-honest parties (intersection
of two sets). Freedman et al. [37] propose a completely dierent solution involving87
the formulation of polynomials by one party and their evaluation by another. This
solution is very ecient in terms of round and communication complexity. However,
in terms of computation complexity, it is not scalable to the sizes required for data
mining (since some of the assumptions used in their analysis no longer hold).
4.1.1 Problem Denition
Assume k > 2 parties, P0;:::;Pk 1. Each party Pi has set Si  U chosen from
a common global universe. The problem is to securely compute the size of the
intersection set, j \
k 1
i=0 Sij.
4.1.2 Algorithm / Protocol
A quick overview of the algorithm idea, along with several needed denitions are
now given, before presenting the entire protocol.
Algorithm Idea
The key idea behind the algorithm is simple. It is not necessary to have the
actual set elements to compute the cardinality of the intersection set. Instead, the
parties jointly generate a mapping from U that no party knows in its entirety. The
mapping is used to transform the sets Si, then the intersection is performed on
the transformed sets. Since no party knows the mapping, they cannot reverse the
mapping to nd the value of any element.
A secure keyed commutative hash function can be used to perform such a map-
ping, and has other properties that will be useful in proving the security properties
of the algorithm. We now formally dene such a hash function.88
Commutative One-way Hash Functions
The denitions of properties used below are collated from [62].
Denition 4.1.1 A commutative keyed one way hash function (CKHF) is a func-
tion hk, parameterized by a secret key k, with the following properties:
1. ease of computation { for a known function hk, given a value k and an input
x, it is easy to compute hk(x).
2. 2nd-preimage resistance { it is computationally infeasible to nd a second input
that has the same output as any specied input, i.e., given x, to nd a 2nd-
preimage x0 6= x such that h(x) = h(x0).
3. collision resistance { it is computationally infeasible to nd any two distinct
inputs x, x0 that hash to the same output, i.e., h(x) = h(x0). A stronger form
of collision resistance is to require 8x 6= x0;h(x) 6= h(x0).
4. commutative hashing { given two instances of a keyed hash function hk pa-
rameterized with 2 dierent keys k1 and k2 and an input x, hk1(hk2(x)) =
hk2(hk1(x)).
5. key non-recovery { given one or more text-hash pairs (xi;hk(xi)) for the same
k, it must be computationally infeasible to recover k.
A commutative public key encryption scheme such as Pohlig-Hellman can be used
to generate a hash function satisfying all our requirements. Each party generates its
own keypair (Ei;Di). The length in bits for the keypair is commonly agreed upon
and known to all parties (1024 bits is common today). The hash function hki is
simply encryption with Ei. The decryption keys are not needed.
Algorithm
There are three stages to the protocol: hashing, initial intersection, and nal
intersection. In the hashing stage, each party hashes (encrypts) its own items with its89
own key. The parties then pass the set to their neighbor to be hashed. This continues
until all sets have been encrypted by all keys. Since hashing is commutative, the
resulting values from two dierent sets will be equal if the original values were the
same (i.e., the item was present in both sets). Collision resistance ensures that this
will happen only if the original values were the same.
In the initial intersection stage, each party sends the set it has to all parties
except its right neighbor, the original owner of the set. All parties then compute the
intersection of all the sets received. If the size of this intersection is less than a user-
determined threshold r, the protocol is aborted. This is to avoid probing attacks;
an attempt to probe for the existence of a particular item in the set gives at best a
probability 1=r estimate of its existence. (A party whose items are all present in the
intersection also learns of the existence of particular items, but this is an unavoidable
artifact of the result. Revealing that an individual is one of a suciently large group
is often viewed as sucient protection of privacy [81]; this also gives a oor for r.)
In the nal stage, the intersections are sent to the right neighbor. The nal result is
the size of the intersection of the received set with the one generated in the initial
intersection stage. A complete description of the algorithm is given as Protocol 17.
We now give additional clarication of the algorithm.
Hashing In this stage the sets of all the parties are hashed by all parties. Since
each party hashes with a key known only to itself, and the order of items is
randomly permuted, no other party can determine the mapping performed by
the previous party.
Initial Intersection In this stage, every party nds the intersection of all sets
except its own. The hashing prevents learning the actual values corresponding
to the hashed items received. The reason a site does not get its own set is to
prevent probing attacks: a site could initially generate a singleton set to probe
if that item existed at another site, i.e., if the intersection of its set with that90
Require: k > 2 sites, each having a local set Si
Require: Maximum local set size m, and threshold r used to protect against probing
for all sites i fParallel operationsg do
Generate the hash key Ei
for j = jSij to m do
Si   Si[fprex not in U:i:jg fPad Si with items that will be unique to that
site and cannot contribute to the intersection.g
end for
fStage 1 { Hashingg
M   EncryptAndPermute(Si;Ei)
send M to site i + 1 mod k
for p = 1:::k   2 do
M0   receive from site i   1 mod k
M00   EncryptAndPermute(M0;Ei)
send M00 to site i + 1 mod k
end for
M0   receive from site i   1 mod k
M00   EncryptAndPermute(M0;Ei)
send M00 to all sites except site i + 1 mod k
fStage 2 { Initial Intersection of sets and check for probingg
TSj   receive from site j, j 6= i   1
TS0
i   \
k 1
p=0;p6=i 1TSp
if jTS0
ij < r then
broadcast ABORT fDetect/prevent probingg
else
fStage 3 { Final Intersection to compute Final Resultg
Send TS0
i to party i + 1 mod k
Receive TS0
i 1 mod k from party i   1 (mod k)
TS0
i   TS0
i \ TS0
i 1 mod k
return jTS0
ij
end if
end for
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Function EncryptAndPermute(Set M, Key Ek)
Require: M is the input array to be hashed, Ek is the hash key
C   ;
for all j 2 M do
C   C [ fEk(j)g ;
end for
randomly permute C to prevent tracking values
return C
of another site is empty or of size 1. Aborting prevents probes for sets of size
less than r.
This also shows the reason that we require k > 2 parties. With two parties, no
intersection could be performed without access to the hashed values of one's
own set. This prevents the probe detection/prevention.
Final Intersection Each party sends the remaining piece of the puzzle to its left
neighbor. This enables all parties to compute the nal intersection and nd
the nal result, viz. the cardinality of the total intersection set.
The collision resistance property of the hash function ensures that no collisions
can occur. Thus the algorithm clearly generates the correct result for the size of
the intersection set. A similar technique was used by Agrawal et al. [3] to compute
intersection, equijoin, intersection size and equijoin size. However, their technique is
limited to two parties and to semi-honest adversaries.
4.1.3 Communication and Computation Analysis
Communication protocols of this type are generally analyzed either based on the
communication cost or number of encryptions performed. The encryption cost is
entirely contained in Stage 1: Each party hashes every item once, giving k2  m92
encryptions. The inherent parallelism gives a factor of k speedup, for a computation
time cost of k  m.
The communication cost for a single party is as follows. In stage 1, a set of
size m is transmitted in each of the rst k   1 rounds. In round k, a set is sent
to k   2 of the other parties. Assuming no multicast this requires 2k   3 messages
of m  hashed item size bits. Stage 2 requires no transmission (except possibly a
broadcast ABORT). In Stage 3, a message is sent containing the intersection of all
but one party. This message is at most size m hashed items, but would typically be
closer to the lower bound of jSj items. Thus, neglecting abort, each site sends 2k 2
message of at most size m  hashed item size bits.
The entire protocol is symmetric, so all of the parties transmit equal amounts of
data. So, to calculate the total communication cost, we simply multiply the single
party cost by k. Thus, the upper bound on the total communication cost of the
algorithm is
k  (2k   2) = O(k2) messages
k  (2k   2)  m  hashed item size = O(k2m) bits
k rounds
The factor of m can be reduced to jSij, at the cost of revealing the size of each
site's set. This is done by skipping the padding to size m step at the beginning of
Protocol 17. As this is likely to be more sensitive than the sizes of intersections, we
have detailed the more secure version.
4.1.4 Security Analysis
The intersection algorithm described above clearly calculates the size of the in-
tersection set without revealing what items are present in any set. However, it is
not quite secure based on the standard of Denition 2.3.1. In addition to the size
of the complete set intersection, the parties can learn the size of the intersection of
subsets of the entire group. Specically, for any set C  f0;:::;k 1g such that i 62
C;jCj  2, party i can compute j \j2C Sjj.93
By acknowledging that these subset intersection sizes are revealed, we can prove
that nothing else is disclosed by Protocol 17. We eectively augment the result with
the \leaked information". We then show how to build a polynomial time simulator
for the view of every party using only the augmented output for that party and their
own input.
Theorem 4.1.1 Protocol 17 privately computes the size of the intersection set jSj =
j\
k 1
p=0Spj. Site i learns at most j\p2CSpj;8C  f0;:::;k 1g such that i 62 C;jCj 
2. If j \p=0;:::;i 2;i;:::;k 1 Spj  r it learns that value and the nal result jSj.
Proof. Since the protocol is symmetric, proving that the view of one party can
be simulated with its own input and output suces to prove it for all parties. We
now show how to simulate the messages received by party i. Given these, it uses its
own input and hash key to simulate the rest of its view by running the appropriate
parts of Protocol 17. The protocol consists of three stages. The initialization phase
can be done based on i's own input, so we begin with the messages received in Stage
1.
Stage 1 At each step of this stage, party i receives a new local set from part i  
1 mod k. However, each item in each of these sets has been hashed (encrypted). The
preimage resistance, collision resistance, and key non-recovery properties combine to
ensure that the distribution of the hashed values (as the key changes) is independent
of the distribution of the data. This allows us to state that the values in these sets
are computationally indistinguishable from numbers chosen from a uniform random
distribution. We can simulate the received set M0 by randomly choosing m values
uniformly distributed over the domain of the hash function E.
This allows us to simulate a single M0. Each M0 seen by i is hashed by a dierent
set of keys, i.e., the rst is hashed with Ei 1(x), the second by Ei 1(Ei 2(x)), etc.
(For brevity we drop the mod k, it should be assumed in all index computations.)
Regardless of any relationship between items in Si 1 and Si 2, the dierent hashes94
and permutation ensure that i sees no relationship. Therefore, the argument that
randomly choosing values allows us to simulate M0 extends to the set of all k 1 M0
sets.
Stage 2 Party i now receives k 1 sets TSj, corresponding to the fully hashed sets
from all but party i. TSi is the last M00 generated in Stage 1, and is simulated with
the nal M00 generated in the simulation of Stage 1. While the hashing/encryption
guarantees that any single item in these sets is equally likely to come from anywhere
in the domain of E, we can not simply generate random values for the other TSj.
The problem is the need to simulate intersections. Since all parties have hashed
all items, and because the hashing is commutative, if Sg and Sh have an item in
common, then TSg 1 and TSh 1 will also have an item in common.
To simulate this, we take advantage of knowing j \p2C Spj. The simulator rst
generates a directed acyclic graph from these intersection sizes, and uses this to
calculate the number of items that should be common at each node. It then does
a breadth-rst traversal, generating the required number of items at each node and
placing the items in the leaf sets reachable from that node. \Generating" an item
happens in two ways: When TSi is one of the reachable leaves, an item is chosen
(without replacement) from TSi. Otherwise, a random value from the domain of E
is used.
A detailed description of this process is given as Simulator 1. A demonstration
of the simulation algorithm for three parties is given in Figure 4.1.
Party i can now generate TS0
i and determine if it should send an ABORT message.
It also knows if it should receive an ABORT, as this is part of the result. If the result
is not an ABORT, we must simulate Stage 3.
Stage 3 Party i now receives TS0
i 1. Since jTS0
i 1j  r, i is allowed to learn the size
of this set (i is not probing). This set is simulated by choosing jSj items from TS0
i,
and randomly choosing jTS0
ij jSj from the domain of E. The encryption arguments95
Generate the hierarchical directed graph G connecting all of the intersection sets
to their immediate descendents.
 f0;:::;i   1;i + 1;:::;k   1g is the root,
 All sets with k   2 elements are level 2,
 :::
 All 2-sets are at level k   2,
 f1g;:::;fi   1g;fi + 1g;:::;fk   1g (i.e. sets for all parties other than i)
are leaves at level k   1,
 An edge is added from p to c if c is a subset of the set represented by p
obtained by removing one number.
Each node n is assigned the size of the corresponding intersection set j \p2n Spj,
nodes at level k   1 are assigned m.
for l = 1::k   1 do
for all nodes p at level l do
if i 2 p then
items   remove p:size items from M00
else
items   remove p:size items from (domain of E   M00)
end if
for all TSj;j 2 p do
TSj   TSj [ items
end for
for all c child of n do
c:size   c:size   p:size
end for
end for
end for
Simulator 1: GenInput: Generating Input Sets for Party i96
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Figure 4.1. Building the simulated input set97
used for Stage 1 still hold to protect the value of the items, and the known \leaked"
information is sucient to perform the simulation.
Denition 2.3.1 requires that this simulation be polynomial time. Stages 1 and 3
are clearly polynomial. Stage 2 requires construction and breadth-rst traversal of
a graph consisting of all powersets of k  1 nodes. The graph is exponential in k, an
apparent conict. However, the requirement is that the simulation be polynomial in
the size of the input m, we can treat k as xed. In the graph traversal of Algorithm 1,
we generate km items to ll the leaves. Since generating each item (either choosing
an item from TSi or randomly generating one) is polynomial, and we perform one
such operation for each item in the input, the simulation is polynomial.
The denitions we have given are for the semi-honest model: parties follow the
protocol, but may try to learn additional details from what they see during the
execution. The malicious model for Secure Multiparty Computation looks at the case
where parties may not play by the rules. Protocol 17 does not quite meet malicious
standards, as a malicious party can cause incorrect results without detection. From
the proof of Theorem 4.1.1 we can see that the disclosure properties do hold in the
face of a malicious party. No party sees information hashed with the same set of keys
twice, so altering an outgoing message to learn how it is hashed would not enable
learning anything from an incoming message. This is true as long as there is no
collusion between parties. However, if two parties collude, they could jointly mount
a probing attack by returning each party's fully hashed items to that party.
4.2 A More Ecient Set Intersection Protocol
The symmetric algorithm we have presented in section 4.1 is simple and proven
eective at controlling the disclosure of information. We now present a more com-
plex variant that gives asymptotically improved performance in number of rounds,
number of messages, and total number of bits transmitted. It also provides a prac-98
tical improvement in information disclosure; the same total information is disclosed,
but each party only sees a piece of that information.
4.2.1 Problem Denition
The problem to be solved is the one dened in Section 4.1.1.
4.2.2 Algorithm / Protocol
The key insight behind this protocol is to overlap the hashing and intersection
phases. Note that any arbitrary parenthesization of the intersection expression still
gives the same result.
S0 \ S1 \ ::: \ Sk

(:::(S0 \ S1) \ S2) \ ::: \ Sk)

(S0 \ S1) \ (S2 \ S3) \ ::: \ (Sk 1 \ Sk)
The second observation is that it is not necessary to hash every set with all keys before
intersecting the sets. Any time two items have been hashed by the same set of keys,
they can be tested for equality. With careful ordering of the hashing we can perform
the innermost intersections early. Repeating this at each level, the intersections can
be carried out in the form of a binary tree, reformulating the intersection as
(:::(logk)   1:::((S0 \ S1) \ (S2 \ S3)) \ ::: \ (Sk 1 \ Sk):::logk :::)
The diculty is with carrying out intersections of two sets. As pointed out in
Section 4.1.2, a party that sees the hashed results of its own set can probe, requiring
at least three parties to perform the intersection. The solution is to use a party from
the opposite side of the tree as this third party. Each party hashes its set and sends
it to its \intersection partner". The partner hashes it, and both send them to the99
5: C intersects both sets it receives to get the result
4: B encrypts and sends its set to C
3: A encrypts and sends its set to C
4: Eb(Ea(Y)) 3: Ea(Eb(X))
2: B sends its key, Eb, to A
1: A sends its key, Ea, to B
2: Eb
1:Ea
5
B
C
A
Figure 4.2. A single binary set intersection using a third party
parent third party. The third party performs the intersection. An example of this is
given in Figure 4.2.
Each parent now has the intersection of the sets of its children, hashed with the
keys of its children. To compute the intersection with its sibling, it must hash these
items with the keys of its sibling's children. Since it does not see any items from
its sibling's children, it gains no information by having these keys. Once this is
complete, the siblings can send their intersections up the tree to compute the next
level of intersection. This process is repeated until the root is reached, giving the
nal intersection. This process is illustrated in Figure 4.3. The complete algorithm
is given in Protocol 18, and depicted graphically in Figure 4.4.
Interior nodes are assigned so that no node is on the path from itself (as a leaf)
to the root. This avoids any information leak based on knowing the size of the
intersection of one's own set with any subset of other nodes. (The root is the only
node to learn the size of a subset containing its own set, but this subset contains100
2: n leaves send their encryption keys E’1 .. E’n to A
5: C intersects what it has received from both A and B to get the result
5
Y1 X1 Xm
A B
C
Yn
1: m leaves send their encryption keys E1 .. Em to B
4: B applies all encryption keys to its set and sends it to C
3: A applies all encryption keys to its set and sends it to C
1: E1 .. Em 2: E’1 .. E’n
4: E1(..(Em(E’1(..(E’n(Y1 ..       .. Yn)..)
U
3: E’1(..(E’n(E1(..(Em(X1 ..       .. Xm)..)
U
Figure 4.3. Higher-level set intersection101
2
Stage 1
Stage 2
Stage   (log   k)
A
k−2,..,k
1,..,k
1,2,3,4
k−1,k k−2,k−3 3,4 1,2
k−1 A k 4 3 2 1 A A A A
Figure 4.4. A more ecient protocol
half the nodes.) If the number of parties is a power of two, they form a complete
tree with each party acting as both a leaf and at most once as an interior node.
Only k   1 parties are needed to act as interior nodes. If the tree is not complete,
we can still make such an assignment provided k  4. Leaf nodes whose sibling is
not a leaf hash their own set with their own key, and with the keys of their sibling's
children. The protocol then proceeds as normal. This eliminates the need for one
interior node from the leaves on the other side of the tree. Balancing the tree with
respect to these singleton nodes enables an assignment such that no node is on its
own path to the root.
Since the sets each parent receives are hashed with the same set of keys, the
commutative hashing property guarantees that the intersection of those sets will
be of the correct size. Associativity of intersection ensures that the order does not102
Require: k > 3 sites numbered 0:::k   1, each having a local set Si
Require: Maximum local set size m, threshold r used to protect against probing
for all sites i do
Generate a binary tree with k leaves at levels log2(k) and log2(k)   1. Even leaves are to the
left of root, odd to the right. If the tree is not complete, the lowest numbered nodes form the
lowest level.
Number non-leaf nodes as follows. 0 is root. The left-hand side is numbered with odd numbers
using a preorder traversal, the right side with even numbers.
fEach site now has an identical view of the tree.g
Generate the hash key Ei
for j = jSij to m do
Si   Si [ fprex not in U:i:jg fPad Si with unique items.g
end for
M   EncryptAndPermute(Si;Ei)
if the sibling of i is a leaf then
Send Ei to sibling
E   receive from sibling
M   EncryptAndPermute(M;E)
end if
Send fEig to the sibling of the parent of leaf i
if the sibling of i is a leaf then
Send M to parent
end if
end for
fNodes now act based on their \interior" position in the tree. For nodes whose sibling is not a
leaf, the interior and leaf positions are the same.g
for all sites i > 0 do
KeySeti   receive key set from left child of interior node i of sibling
KeySeti   KeySeti[ receive key set from right child of sibling
if the sibling of i is a leaf fsite i is also an interior nodeg then
Ml   receive from left child
Mr   receive from right child
M   Ml \ Mr
end if
if jMj < r then
Broadcast ABORT fPotential Probeg
else
for all E 2 KeySeti do
M   EncryptAndPermute(M;E)
end for
if parent of i is not 0 then
Send KeySeti to sibling of parent of interior node i
end if
Send M to parent of interior node i
end if
end for
if site is 0 then
Ml   receive from left child, Mr   receive from right child
Broadcast result jMl \ Mrj
end if
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aect the result. An inductive argument shows that the protocol generates the
correct result.
Protocol 18 demonstrates another optimization. Instead of sending sets to be
hashed by other sites, a site sends its key. The numbering of the tree ensures that
no site sees items hashed with any key it knows (except root, which knows only its
own key and sees items hashed with that plus several others.) Thus, in the absence
of collusion, sending a key gives the receiver no additional information.
4.2.3 Communication and Computation Analysis
At rst glance, the encryption cost appears similar to Protocol 17. Every item in
the nal intersection is hashed with every key. However, duplicate items are ltered
out at higher levels. This reduces the number of items to be hashed. Leaf nodes
perform 2m encryptions. Lowest level parent nodes perform 2 additional encryptions
on every item in the intersection of their children; at most 2m. The next level must
hash with 4 keys. The level below the root ends up with k=2 keys. Multiplying by
the number of nodes at each level gives k  m encryptions at each level, for a worst
case total of (2k + k log2(k))  m encryptions. Parallelism gives some benet, but
since the upper levels perform more encryptions the encryption time is still O(km).
More important is the savings in number of rounds and messages. The number of
rounds of messages is one for the leaf key exchange, and dlog2(k)e rounds of sending
key sets and hashed sets up the tree. The key exchange requires each leaf to send
one message of the number of bits in the hash key. (The one or two \extra" nodes
whose sibling is not a leaf are spared sending this message.) For each edge in the
tree there is one \hashed set" message and (except for the root) a corresponding
key set message, for a total of 2k   4 messages. Each hashed set message is at most
m  hashed item size bits. The key set messages grow as they grow up the tree; a
total of k  hash key size bits are sent at each level.104
The overall communication cost of Protocol 18 is then:
3k   4 = O(k) messages
klog2(k)  hash key size + 2(k   1)m  hashed item size  O(k  m) bits
dlog2(k)e = O(logk) rounds
This is a substantial improvement over the O(k2) messages, O(k2m) bits, and O(k)
rounds of Protocol 17.
The number of bits and number of encryptions is in practice a pessimistic esti-
mate. It is likely that the size of intersections will be signicantly smaller than m,
and will rapidly approach jSj. While the asymptotic results do not change, the eect
of parallelism on the encryption cost is likely to improve signicantly, as the majority
of encryptions occur only at the low levels. The set message sizes at higher levels will
also shrink, although each key transmission message will grow. Thus, the eective
total time to run the algorithm should be closer to O(m + logk) than O(mlogk).
4.2.4 Security Analysis
Protocol 17 is symmetric, and reveals to all parties the intersections of any subset
of items except its own. Protocol 18 reveals the same type of information, however,
each site learns the intersection size of at most three subsets:
 j \p2descendants Spj
 j \p2left descendants Spj
 j \p2right descendants Spj
The total information revealed is considerably less, O(k) intersections as opposed to
O(2k). In addition, the limited amount revealed to any party enables an assignment
of parties to nodes based on trust and which specic intersections can be disclosed.
This gives considerable exibility in meeting specic security policy goals.
Theorem 4.2.1 Protocol 18 privately computes the size of the intersection set jSj =
j\
k 1
p=0 Spj. Each site learns the nal result, and if it serves as an interior node in the
tree it learns:105
 j \p2descendants Spj
 j \p2left descendants Spj
 j \p2right descendants Spj
Proof. The proof proceeds by simulating the view of a party i as it proceeds
through Protocol 18. The simulator eectively runs Protocol 18, all we need to show
is that the received messages can be simulated.
First, let us look at the case of an \extra" node: a leaf whose sibling is not a
leaf. These nodes (at most two, one odd and one even) serve in the same spot as a
leaf and interior node. If i is one of these nodes, it will receive the keys Ei 2 and
Ei 4. This is the only message it receives. Since these were not used to generate any
information i will receive, they can be simulated by randomly generating keys for the
hash function E. Protocol 18 generates the rest of the view for these nodes, except
for receiving the nal result. As the result is known to the simulator, generating it
is trivial.
The remaining non-root nodes are slightly more complex, as they receive three
sets of messages. The rst message received is the key of their sibling in their
position as a leaf. This is simulated by randomly generating a key for the hash
function E. The next are the two sets of keys of their sibling's descendants based on
their position as an interior node. These are simulated by randomly generating keys
for the hash function E, the number of keys to generate is known from i's position
in the tree. The nal messages received by i are the intersection sets of i's left and
right descendants. To simulate these, i takes advantage of three facts:
1. i knows the sizes j\p2left descendantsSpj and j\p2right descendantsSpj of the received
sets,
2. i knows the number of items the two sets have in common j \p2descendants Spj,
and
3. i has no knowledge of the keys used to hash the items in the sets.106
Using fact 2, the simulator for i generates j\p2descendantsSpj items, by randomly select-
ing items from a uniform distribution over the domain of E, and places them in both
the simulated Ml and Mr. Fact 1 is then used to complete Ml and Mr, by generating
j \p2left descendants Spj   j \p2descendants Spj to insert into Ml and j \p2right descendants
Spj   j \p2descendants Spj to insert into Mr.
The simulated sets Ml and Mr are now the same size as those seen in the actual
protocol, and their intersection contains the same number of items as those in the
actual protocol. Since i has no knowledge of the keys used to hash the items (fact 3),
security of hashing/encryption guarantees values in hashed sets are computationally
indistinguishable from values chosen from a uniform random distribution over the
domain of the hash function E. Therefore, the simulated view is computationally
indistinguishable from that seen by i during the actual execution of the protocol.
The argument for site 0, the root, is slightly dierent. The simulator is the same
as other interior nodes. This site receives only E2, the key of its sibling. It does see
items hashed with E2, as well as its own key E0, so fact 3 does not hold. However,
by the time it sees items hashed with E0 and E2, they have also been hashed with
(at least) E1. Since 0 does not know E1, the computational indistinguishability
argument still holds.
The simulator requires one key generation or selection of a random value from the
domain of E for each item in the received messages. The number of items is bounded
by the maximum set size m. Assuming key generation or random value selection is
polynomial in the size of the input, and that Protocol 18 runs in polynomial time
(see Section 4.2.3), the view seen by any site i can be simulated in time polynomial
in the size of the input.
Absent collusion, Protocol 18 is as eective as Protocol 17 with malicious parties.
A malicious party can alter what it sends, however, since it never sees anything based
on messages it has sent except the nal output it can only gain information from the
nal result. This constitutes a probing attack, and the information gain possible is
restricted by the minimum size threshold r. Site 0 does see information based on its107
rst set of messages, however the intermediate hashing and threshold test prevents
it from gaining additional information from what it sent as a leaf.
Collusion poses a signicant problem. Collusion between the parent of a leaf
node and its right child can give it both the hash key El and the hashed set Ml of
the left child. It can now probe for the existence of any item I in that set, by testing
if El(I) 2 Ml. Collusion with its own sibling or the sibling of its ancestors also gives
it this key. Even if some sites were not trusted (i.e., they may collude with some
other sites), it would often be possible to assign sites to tree nodes in such a way
that the untrusted sites would not gain by colluding.
4.3 Algebraic Method for Computing Dot Product
4.3.1 Problem Denition
Consider two real-valued vectors ~ X and ~ Y of cardinality n, ~ X = (x1;;xn); ~ Y =
(y1;;yn). The scalar product (or dot product) of ~ X and ~ Y is dened as ~ X  ~ Y =
Pn
i=1 xi  yi. If party A has the vector ~ X and party B has the vector ~ Y , securely
compute the scalar product ~ X  ~ Y .
4.3.2 Protocol
Scalar product protocols have been proposed in the Secure Multiparty Compu-
tation literature [9], however these cryptographic solutions do not scale well to data
mining problems. We give an algebraic solution that hides true values by placing
them in equations masked with random values. The knowledge disclosed by these
equations only allows computation of private values if one side learns a substantial
number of the private values from an outside source. (A dierent algebraic tech-
nique has recently been proposed [46], however it requires at least twice the bitwise
communication cost of the method presented here.)
We assume without loss of generality that n is even.108
Step 1: A generates randoms R1 :::Rn. From these, ~ X, and a matrix C forming
coecients for a set of linear independent equations, A sends the following vector
~ X0 to B:
hx1 + c1;1  R1 + c1;2  R2 +  + c1;n  Rni
hx2 + c2;1  R1 + c2;2  R2 +  + c2;n  Rni
. . .
hxn + cn;1  R1 + cn;2  R2 +  + cn;n  Rni
In step 2, B computes S = ~ X0  ~ Y . B also calculates the following n values:
hc1;1  y1 + c2;1  y2 +  + cn;1  yni
hc1;2  y1 + c2;2  y2 +  + cn;2  yni
. . .
hc1;n  y1 + c2;n  y2 +  + cn;n  yni
But B can't send these values, since A would then have n independent equations
in n unknowns (y1 :::yn), revealing the y values. Instead, B generates r random val-
ues, R0
1 ...R0
r. The number of values A would need to know to obtain full disclosure
of B's values is governed by r.
B partitions the n values created earlier into r sets, and the R' values are used
to hide the equations as follows:
hc1;1  y1 + c2;1  y2 +  + cn;1  yn + R0
1i
. . .
hc1;n=r  y1 + c2;n=r  y2 +  + cn;n=r  yn + R0
1i
hc1;(n=r+1)  y1 + c2;(n=r+1)  y2+
 + cn;(n=r+1)  yn + R0
2i
. . .
hc1;2n=r  y1 + c2;2n=r  y2 +  + cn;2n=r  yn + R0
2i
. . .
hc1;((r 1)n=r+1)  y1 + c2;((r 1)n=r+1)  y2+
 + cn;((r 1)n=r+1)  yn + R0
ri
. . .
hc1;n  y1 + c2;n  y2 +  + cn;n  yn + R0
ri109
Then B sends S and the n above values to A, who now has:
S =(x1 + c1;1  R1 + c1;2  R2 +  + c1;n  Rn)  y1
+(x2 + c2;1  R1 + c2;2  R2 +  + c2;n  Rn)  y2
. . .
+(xn + cn;1  R1 + cn;2  R2 +  + cn;n  Rn)  yn
Simplifying further and grouping the xi  yi terms gives:
S =(x1  y1 + x2  y2 +  + xn  yn)
+(y1  c1;1  R1 + y1  c1;2  R2 +  + y1  c1;n  Rn)
+(y2  c2;1  R1 + y2  c2;2  R2 +  + y2  c2;n  Rn)
. . .
+(yn  cn;1  R1 + yn  cn;2  R2 +  + yn  cn;n  Rn)
The rst line of the right hand side can be succinctly written as
Pn
i=1 xi  yi, the
desired nal result. In the remaining portion, we group all multiplicative components
vertically, and rearrange the equation to factor out all the Ri values, giving:
S =
n X
i=1
xi  yi
+R1  (c1;1  y1 + c2;1  y2 +  + cn;1  yn)
+R2  (c1;2  y1 + c2;2  y2 +  + cn;2  yn)
. . .
+Rn  (c1;n  y1 + c2;n  y2 +  + cn;n  yn)
Adding and subtracting the same quantity from one side of the equation does
not change the equation in any way. Hence, the above equation can be rewritten as
follows:110
S =
n X
i=1
xi  yi
+fR1  (c1;1  y1 + c2;1  y2 +  + cn;1  yn)
+R1  R
0
1   R1  R
0
1g
. . .
+fRn=r  (c1;n=r  yn=r + c2;n=r  y2 +  + cn;n=r  yn)
+Rn=r  R
0
1   Rn=r  R
0
1g
+fRn=r+1  (c1;n=r+1  yn=r+1 + c2;n=r+1  y2 +
 + cn;n=r+1  yn)
+Rn=r+1  R
0
2   Rn=r+1  R
0
2g
. . .
+fR2n=r  (c1;2n=r  y2n=r + c2;2n=r  y2 +
 + cn;2n=r  yn)
+R2n=r  R
0
2   R2n=r  R
0
2g
. . .
. . .
+fR(r 1)n=r+1  (c1;(r 1)n=r+1  y(r 1)n=r+1 +
c2;(r 1)n=r+1  y2 +  + cn;(r 1)n=r+1  yn)
+R(r 1)n=r+1  R
0
r   R(r 1)n=r+1  R
0
rg
. . .
+fRn  (c1;n  y1 + c2;n  y2 +  + cn;n  yn)
+Rn  R
0
r   Rn  R
0
rg111
Now A factors out the Ri from the rst two components and groups the rest
vertically, giving:
S =
n X
i=1
xi  yi
+R1  (c1;1  y1 + c2;1  y2 +  + cn;1  yn + R
0
1)
. . .
+Rn=r  (c1;n=r  yn=r + c2;n=r  y2 +
 + cn;n=r  yn + R
0
1)
+Rn=r+1  (c1;n=r+1  yn=r+1 + c2;n=r+1  y2 +
 + cn;n=r+1  yn + R
0
2)
. . .
+R2n=r  (c1;2n=r  y2n=r + c2;2n=r  y2 +
 + cn;2n=r  yn + R
0
2)
. . .
+R(r 1)n=r+1  (c1;(r 1)n=r+1  y(r 1)n=r+1 +
c2;(r 1)n=r+1  y2 +  + cn;(r 1)n=r+1  yn + R
0
r)
. . .
+Rn  (c1;n  y1 + c2;n  y2 +  + cn;n  yn + R
0
r)
 R1  R
0
1      Rn=r  R
0
1
 Rn=r+1  R
0
2      R2n=r  R
0
2
. . .
 R(r 1)n=r+1  R
0
r      Rn  R
0
r
A already knows the n Ri values. B also sent n other values, these are the
coecients of the n Ri values above.112
A multiplies the n values received from B with the corresponding Ri and sub-
tracts the sum from S to get:
Temp =
n X
i=1
xi  yi
 R1  R
0
1      Rn=r  R
0
1
 Rn=r+1  R
0
2      R2n=r  R
0
2
. . .
 R(r 1)n=r+1  R
0
r      Rn  R
0
r
Factoring out the R0
i gives:
Temp =
n X
i=1
xi  yi
 (R1 + R2 +  + Rn=r)  R
0
1
 (Rn=r+1 + Rn=r+2 +  + R2n=r)  R
0
2
. . .
 (R((r 1)n=r)+1 + R((r 1)n=r)+2 +  + Rn)  R
0
r
To get the desired nal result (viz.
Pn
i=1 xi  yi), A needs to add the sum of the
r multiplicative terms to Temp.
In step 3, A sends the r values to B, and B (knowing R') computes the nal
result. Finally B replies with the result.
Selection of ci;j
The above protocol requires a matrix C of values that form coecients of linear
independent equations. The necessity of this is obvious from the fact that the equa-
tions are used to hide the data values. If any equation can be eliminated using less
than half of the other equations, a linkage between less than n=2 of the unknowns is
created.113
Table 4.1
Communication cost
Rounds Bitwise cost
4 2  n  MaxV alSz O(n)
MaxValSz = Maximum bits to represent any input value
With high probability, a coecient matrix generated by a pseudo-random func-
tion will form linearly independent equations. This enables construction of the ci;j
matrix by sharing only a seed and a generating function.
4.3.3 Communication and Computation Analysis
We rst look at the computation cost. In step 1, A has to generate n random
numbers, and perform n2 multiplications and additions. In step 2, B performs n2+n
additions and multiplications. In step 3, A performs n + r multiplications and
additions (where r << n). In step 4, B performs r computations. Overall, it is quite
clear that the protocol requires O(n2) additions and multiplications, which is quite
low since these are simple arithmetic operations.
Computing support for each candidate itemset requires one run of the component
scalar product protocol. The cost of each run (based on the number of items n is
as follows: A sends one message with n values. B replies with a message consisting
of n + 1 values. A then sends a message consisting of r values. Finally B sends the
result, for a total of four communication rounds. The bitwise communication cost is
O(n) with constant approximately 2 (assuming r is constant). This is summarized
in Table 4.1.
There is also the quadratic cost of communicating the ci;j values. However, this
cost can made constant by agreeing on a function and a seed value to generate the
values.114
Table 4.2
Security analysis of protocol
Protected Number of Total number Number of
values randoms of unknowns equations
generated revealed
A x1 xn n 2n n + r
B y1 yn r n + r n
4.3.4 Security Analysis
The security of the scalar product protocol is based on the inability of either side
to solve k equations in more than k unknowns. Some of the unknowns are randomly
chosen, and can safely be assumed as private. However, if enough data values are
known to the other party, the equations can be solved to reveal all values. Therefore,
the disclosure risk in this method is based on the number of data values that the
other party might know from some external source. Table 4.2 presents the number
of unknowns and equations generated. This shows the number of data values the
other party must have knowledge of to obtain full disclosure.
4.4 Cryptographic Method for Computing Boolean Dot Product
This section presents a purely cryptographic primitive for computing the dot
product for boolean vectors. To be precise, we show how to compute the number of
1s in the logical AND vector of several boolean vectors.
4.4.1 Problem Denition
Let k be the total number of parties with the parties being P1;P2 ;Pk. Each
party has a corresponding n dimensional vector Xi. I.e.,115
P1 has the vector ~ X1 = (x11;:::;x1n)
P2 has the vector ~ X2 = (x21;:::;x2n)
. . .
Pk has the vector ~ Xk = (xk1;:::;xkn)
where all the xij are boolean (either 0 or 1).
Thus, the problem can be dened as follows:
Component Multiplication of k n-dimensional vectors ~ X1 = (x11;:::;x1n), ~ X2 =
(x21;:::;x2n), , ~ Xk = (xk1;:::;xkn) is dened as ~ X =
Qk
i=1 ~ Xi ie. 8n
i=1Xi =
Qk
j=1 Xji
Now, we wish to calculate the sum of the elements of the resulting vector, Sum =
Pn
i=1 Xi The nal step is to check if this sum is greater than the threshold t, ie.
Sum > t? We now show how to compute Sum.
4.4.2 Generic Encryption System
The protocol described below requires a homomorphic probabilistic encryption
system. The generic system used can be described as below (the presentation is
patterned from [86]):
 A security parameter s. This is used to derive several nite domains (R(s),
X(s), Y (s)) which are identied with initial subset of integers. Thus we use
R(s) for fx : 0 < x < r(s)g, X(s) for fx : 0  x < x(s)g and similar notation
for Y (s).
 A public probabilistic encryption function, f : R(s)  X(s) ! Y (s), and a
private decryption algorithm g : Y (s) ! X(s) such that
(8(r;x) 2 R(s)  X(s)) g(f(r;x)) = x (4.1)116
Note that the existence of a decryption algorithm implies that the function is
injective with respect to its second parameter, that is, for (r1;x1);(r2;x2) 2
R(s)  X(s), if f(r1;x1) = f(r2;x2), then x1 = x2
We also require several additional important properties, which are described as
follows:
1. The encryption function should be homomorphic, that is:
8(r1;x1);(r2;x2) 2 R(s)  X(s),
f(r1;x1)f(r2;x2) = f(r3;x1 + x2 mod x(s))
where r3 can be computed in polynomial time from r1;r2;x1 and x2.
2. We ask that the encryption function have semantic security. Informally, this
means that for a polynomially bounded adversary, the analysis of a set of
ciphertexts does not give more information about the cleartexts than what
would be available without knowledge of the ciphertexts. [42] provides a formal
denition.
3. As a result of the prior properties, one more can be deduced. There exists a
\hiding" function hide : R(s)  Y (s) ! Y (s), depending only on the public
parameters of the system and such that:
8(r;x) 2 R(s)  X(s);8s 2 R(s),
hide(s;f(r;x)) = f(sr0 mod r(s);x)
where r0 can be computed in polynomial time from r;x. Indeed, hide can be
dened by hide(s;x) = f(s;0)  x.
4. Finally, we ask that the domain and range of the system are suitably high (to
compute the required sum)
Several real encryption systems satisfy all of the properties required above. Ex-
amples are the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem [14], the Benaloh cryptosystem [12],
the Naccache-Stern cryptosystem [65] and the Okamoto-Uchiyama cryptosystem [68].117
Any of these cryptosystems, excepting the Goldwasser-Micali cryptosystem (since it
is limited to arithmetic mod 2) can be used for our purpose.
4.4.3 Algorithm
We assume that the parties jointly decide on one of the suitable cryptosystems.
The parties also randomly order themselves into a ring. To simplify the presentation,
we assume that this order is the canonical order P1;:::;Pk. In general, any order
is acceptable. The rst party, P1, generates a public key E and private key D for
the cryptosystem decided on above. The public key, E, is broadcast to all the other
parties. The private key, D, is secret and known only to P1. The basic idea of
the algorithm is as follows: for each bit, x1;i, in its vector, P1 generates a random
encryption of that bit (Mi = E(r;x1;i), where r is randomly chosen from R(s)).
P1 sends Mi to P2. Parties P2;:::;Pk 1 act as follows: When Party Pj receives
a message Mi from Pj 1, if its own bit is one (i.e., xj;i = 1), Pj simply hides the
message it receives (computes f(s,0)*x) and sends the hidden message on to the next
party. However, if its bit is 0, Pj then sends a random encryption of 0 to the next
party. Party Pk follows the same computation, so that it has a random encryption
of either 0 or 1 (it does not know which). Now, Pk multiplies all of the encryptions
it has together. Due to the homomorphic property of the encryption, this results
in the sum of all of the component bits. Pk sends this nal encrypted result back
to P1. P1 decrypts this message to get the sum, Sum. It can now check whether
Sum > t, which gives the required result. Protocol 19 gives the complete details of
the algorithm.
Proof of Correctness
Theorem 4.4.1 Algorithm 19 correctly computes Sum.118
Require: k parties P1;:::;Pk, n-dimensional vectors
1: P1 generates a public and private key pair E;D for the homomorphic encryption
system agreed upon.
2: P1 broadcasts the public key E to all other parties.
3:
4: for i = 0;i < n;i + + fFor each bitg do
5: P1:
6: Compute M1;i = E(r;x1;i), (r randomly chosen from R(s))
7: Send M1;i to P2
8:
9: Pj;j = 2;:::;k   1:
10: if xj;i = 0 then
11: Compute Mj;i = hide(r;Mj 1;i), (r randomly chosen from R(s))
12: else
13: Compute Mj;i = E(r;xji)(= E(r;1)), (r randomly chosen from R(s))
14: end if
15: Send Mj;i to Pj+1
16:
17: Pk:
18: if xk;i = 0 then
19: Compute Mk;i = hide(r;Mk 1;i), (r randomly chosen from R(s))
20: else
21: Compute Mk;i = E(r;xk;i)(= E(r;1)), (r randomly chosen from R(s))
22: end if
23: end for
24: Pk : EncSum  
Qn
j=1 Mk;j
25: Pk : Send EncSum to P1
26: P1: Compute Sum = D(EncSum)
Algorithm 19: Computing the boolean dot product, Sum119
Proof. All of the bits in the vector undergo the same operations. Thus to prove
the correctness of the entire algorithm, it is sucient to prove that a single bit of
the result is the correct componentwise multiplication of the corresponding bits of
the vectors ~ X1;:::; ~ Xk (i.e., we just need to prove that D(mk;i) = x1;i  :::  xk;i).
Observe that if xj;i = 0, then party Pj sends forward a random encryption of
0. When Pj has 1, it simply sends forward an obfuscated form of the message it
receives (with P1 sending an encryption of 1 to begin with). Thus Mk;i = E(r;1)
if and only if 8j;xj;i = 1. Other wise Mk;i = E(r;0), for some r 2 R(s). Now,
due to homomorphic property of the encryption, multiplying all of the Mk;i together
gives the encryption of the sum. Thus the decryption of EncSum correctly gives the
required sum, Sum.
4.4.4 Communication and Computation Analysis
The entire protocol is quite ecient. P1 broadcasts the key E to all other parties.
Each party also sends the entire (encrypted) vector to the next party once. Pk
nally sends the encrypted sum back to P1. Thus the total communication cost is
(k 1)keysize+(kn+1)encrypted msg size = O(kn) bits, and k 1+k = 2k 1
messages (assuming the entire vector can be sent o as a single message.
In terms of computation, every party has to perform n encryptions (one for each
bit in its vector), pk has to perform n multiplications and nally P1 has to perform
1 decryption to get the nal result. Thus, there is a total of kn encryptions and 1
decryption.
We ran tests on a SUN Blade 1000 workstation with a 900 Mhz processor and 1
gig of RAM. A C implementation of the Okamoto-Uchiyama [68] encryption system
was tested. The key size was xed at 1152 bits. The computation time required for
dierent values of n are summarized in Table 4.3. The encryption/decryption cost
approximately linearly increases with the number of items. The cost of multiplication
is much lower than the cost of decryption. Using this table, it is very easy to estimate120
100 1000 10000 100000
encrypt 1.33s 13.06s 2.2min 21.5min
decrypt 2.11s 20.80s 3.5min 35.3min
Table 4.3
Computation time required for encryption/decryption
the actual time required for dierent number of parties and dierent vector sizes.
For example, 5 parties with vectors of size 100;000 would require approximately 150
minutes. The time required would be signicantly lower with smaller key sizes and
with use of special purpose encryption hardware.
4.4.5 Security Analysis
We now give a proof of security for the entire protocol.
Theorem 4.4.2 Protocol 19 computes the required sum, Sum while revealing noth-
ing to any site other than its input and the nal output.
Proof. A simulator is presented for the view of each party. We only show how
to simulate the messages received. The rest of the proof trivially follows from this.
P1: The only message received is on line 25. Since the nal result (Sum) is known to
P1, it simply generates a random encryption of this to simulate the message it receives
(choose a random r from R(s) and compute E(r;Sum). This is computationally
indistinguishable from the message it receives since the only thing dierent is the
choice of random r.
P2: The only messages received are on line 2 and 7. The public key E is simulated
simply by randomly choosing a key E over the space of possible keys. The message
M1;i can be simulated by randomly choosing a bit b (0 or 1), uniformly choosing121
a random r from R(s), and computing E(r;b). The semantic security property of
the encryption system guarantees that no advantage or information can be gained
from the ciphertext resulting from the encryption algorithm (even while knowing
the public key, as long as the private key is secret). In other words, it is not com-
putationally possible to distinguish between the encryption of a 0 or a 1 when r is
randomly chosen with uniform probability over R(s). Thus, by selecting a random
r and a random bit b (0 or 1), the encrypted message generated is computationally
indistinguishable from the message received.
P3;:::;Pk: The only messages received are on lines 2 and 15. The same argument
as for P2 applies. The public key E is simulated simply by randomly choosing a key E
over the space of possible keys. The message Mj;i (j = 2;:::;k 1) can be simulated
by randomly choosing a bit b (0 or 1), uniformly choosing a random r from R(s),
and computing E(r;b). This message is computationally indistinguishable from the
message received since the semantic security of the encryption system guarantees that
no extra information is revealed (read prior paragraph for detailed discussion).
4.5 Modied Secure Comparison Protocol
In many protocols, at some stage we need to securely compare the sum of two
numbers with some threshold, with the output split between the parties holding those
numbers. This can be accomplished using the generic circuit evaluation technique
rst proposed by Yao [92]. Formally, we need a modied secure comparison protocol
for two parties, A and B. The local inputs are xa and xb and the local outputs are
ya and yb. All operations on input are in a eld F1 and output are in a eld F2.
ya + yb = 1 (mod F2) if xa + xb (mod F1) > 0, otherwise ya + yb = 0 (mod F2).
A nal requirement is that ya and yb should be independently uniformly distributed
over F (clearly the joint distribution is not uniform).
This builds on the standard secure multiparty computation circuit-based ap-
proach for solving this problem [39]. Eectively, A chooses ya with a uniform distri-122
bution over F, and provides it as an additional input to the circuit that appropriately
computes yb. The circuit is then securely evaluated, with B receiving the output yb.
The complexity of this is equivalent to the complexity of Yao's Millionaire's problem
(simple secure comparison). The security of the protocol is also obvious, since the
generic circuit evaluation technique is used.123
5 EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
Apart from presenting algorithms to solve the problem, we must pay attention to the
actual realization of those algorithms in practice. Thus, instead of simply presenting
prototype versions of some of the algorithms developed, we would like to build a
framework in which privacy preserving data mining can be demonstrated. As a
part of the experimental validation, we give experimental results on two problems {
decision tree classication and association rule mining. Other solutions are also being
implemented, but the rst two serve as a starting point to validate the techniques
developed.
5.1 Weka
To demonstrate real practicality, we implemented the methods as part of an
existing and widely used Data Mining toolkit. Weka [91], developed at the University
of Waikato in New Zealand, is a collection of machine learning algorithms for data
mining tasks implemented in Java. Apart from providing algorithms, it is a general
implementation framework, along with support classes and documentation. It is
extensible and convenient for prototyping purposes. However, the Weka system is
a centralized system meant to be used at a single site. We extended the Weka core
classes \Instance and Instances" to provide support for distributed instances. A
distributed instance consists of only the key identier and the site identiers for the
sites that together contain the whole instance.124
5.2 Decision Tree Classication
We rst developed a general model of operation to extend Weka for privacy
preserving distributed classication. The general model of privacy preserving dis-
tributed classication is as follows. The user initiates a request to build a classier
and then request(s) classication of an instance whenever required. The process of
building the classier needs to be co-ordinated so that the data sites locally con-
struct enough state to enable them to jointly satisfy a classication request. To
this end, every centralized classication class must be extended with a distributed
class that provides the same functionality, however the implementation of these func-
tions/messages is in a distributed manner.
In the current case, we extend the ID3 class with the new class distId3 that fullls
the same contracts as promised by ID3. When called with normal instance(s) the
behavior is identical to ID3, when called with distributed instance(s) the algorithm
performs in a distributed fashion. There is one global co-ordinating class/interface
that provides access to the classication functionality. Figure 5.1 demonstrates the
basic usage model.
We ran experiments with two and three sites on two data sets from the UCI
repository [13]. Each of the processors used in the experimentation was a SUN
Blade 1000 with a 900Mhz processor and 1gig of RAM. The trees, as expected, are
identical to the original ID3 trees. The weather dataset consists of four attributes
plus the class, and fourteen transactions. The car   large is the UCI car dataset;
the car   small is a random subset of 1/2 the transactions, used to demonstrate
scaling in number of transactions. These datasets have six attributes with about
four distinct values each, and a four-class class attribute. There are 885 transactions
in car   small, 1728 in car   large. The sample experimental results are given in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
The ID3 trees for the car datasets are over 300 nodes. This is quite complex.
We can see that this scales linearly in the number of transactions, as expected.125
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Figure 5.1. Basic classier model126
Table 5.1
Building the classier on real data sets
Sites: 2 3
Weather 10s 86s
Car-Small 3.5 hrs 27 hrs
Car-large 7.1 hrs 62hrs
Table 5.2
Classifying an instance on real data sets
Sites: 2 3
Weather < 0:01s 0.02s
Car-Small 0.125s 0.2s
Car-large 0.14s 0.46s
Increase in the number of parties causes a quadratic expansion in the amount of
time required. One of the most important factors aecting the computation time of
the protocol is the size of the tree built. Simpler trees are much faster to build. A
good thing to note is that once the classication tree is built, classifying an instance
takes very little time. Thus, if the (much more expensive) protocol to build the tree
has already been executed, it is an easy (and much less computationally intensive)
task to classify any given instance.
The current implementation is multi-threaded and does exploit parallelism to
the extent possible. Readily available hardware for encryption or implementation in
more highly optimized languages than Java would result in signicant improvement.
This prototype is meant as a demonstration of the viability and correctness of the
protocol.127
Table 5.3
Computation and communication cost of encryption
Number of Key Size Transfer
items encrypted 256 512 1024 Time
1k < 0:0001s 5s 29s 0:0027s
10k 10s 47s 286s 0:007s
100k 90s 467s 2827s 0:04s
1M 900s 4660s 28762s 0:41s
5.3 Association Rule Mining
We have run experiments to evaluate what the actual cost would be for a number
of dierent cases. The experiments were run on a SUN Blade 1000 workstation with
a 900Mhz processor and 1GB of RAM. First, we tabulate the pure encryption cost
for dierent key sizes. An encryption key size of 512 bits is sucient for typical
applications. It can be seen that the computation cost rises linearly with the number
of item to be encrypted (as expected). Note that encryption can proceed at dierent
sites in parallel. Thus Table 5.3 gives the encryption time per round.
We also measured the transfer time required to send the encrypted data from
one site to another over a 100Mb network. The encrypted data required comparable
size in the GNU GMP raw bit format regardless of key size.
Using the data generated in the prior table we can easily estimate the extra cost
incurred by privacy while doing association rule mining in a particular situation
(characterized by the number of transactions, attributes and parties). Table 5.4 esti-
mates the computation cost assuming that the encryption key size is 512 bits. Table
5.5 estimates the communication cost assuming communication is over a 100Mb net-
work. Both assume that attributes can have at most 100k transactions. We give a
worst case scenario estimate assuming that all the attributes are frequent 1-itemsets128
and also encrypting and communicating the entire attribute. In practice, the cost
would be much lower (at least an order of magnitude), since all attributes may not
be frequent and even the frequent attributes are present in only a fraction of the
total number of transactions. The cost for other values of key size and communica-
tion bandwidth can be easily extrapolated using the data provided above. It is clear
from this data that the computation cost greatly exceeds the communication cost.
Computation cost can be drastically reduced by optimizing the code (we used the
generic variant of GNU gmp), or through widely-available special-purpose encryp-
tion hardware. Note that the cost described here is the additional cost of assuring
privacy. We still need to compute the association rules at each site. Overall, though
expensive, the process is much faster than obtaining necessary approval to release
data, assuming such approval could be obtained.
5.4 Summary
A rst look at the experimental results may suggest that in comparison to cen-
tralized data mining algorithms, our performance is exceedingly slow. However,
there are two caveats to this. First, our performance is much better than the gen-
eral secure solutions possible. Second, and even more importantly, privacy is not
free. If one has no privacy/security concerns, there is no reason why any of these
algorithms should be used. It is simple enough to simply send all the data to a cen-
tral site and let it do the mining, or use other distributed data mining techniques.
However, when privacy/security concerns do exist, one can clearly see that the true
comparison is between the time taken by our algorithms versus the time required
to get approval, e.g., through an Institutional Review Board for Human Subjects
Research, if it is even possible. In this sense, our algorithms are clearly practical and
enable functionalities which would otherwise be prohibited.129
Table 5.4
Worst-case added computation to achieve privacy
Number of Number of Sites
attributes 2 3 5 10 20
10 9340s 14010s 23350s 46700s -
50 13hr 19.5hr 32.5hr 65hr 130hr
100 26hr 39hr 65hr 130hr 260hr
200 52hr 78hr 130hr 260hr 520hr
Table 5.5
Worst-case communication cost increase to achieve privacy
Number of Number of Sites
attributes 2 3 5 10 20
10 1.6s 3.6s 10s 40s -
50 8s 18s 50s 200s 800s
100 16s 36s 100s 400s 1600s
200 32s 72s 200s 800s 3200s130
6 SUMMARY
To summarize, the thesis is that privacy-preserving data mining over vertically par-
titioned data is both feasible and practical. The dissertation has presented a set of
underlying techniques, which are used to construct several privacy-preserving data
mining algorithms operating over vertically partitioned data, which enable the \min-
ing" of knowledge.
Privacy/Security concerns have become an enduring part of society and com-
merce. It is increasingly necessary to ensure that useful computation does not vio-
late legal/commercial norms for the safety of personal data. The thesis demonstrates
that Privacy and Data Mining are not inherently in conict. The major contribu-
tion has been to develop solutions for representatives of all of the major data mining
tasks: classication, clustering, association rule mining and outlier detection.
Some of the tools developed are interesting in and of themselves. They are
denitely applicable even beyond the scope of data mining. For example, we have
developed privacy preserving solutions for optimization problems (such as linear
programming) by utilizing some of the underlying techniques developed. In the
future, we intend to look at other interesting practical problems.
One of the big drawbacks of Secure Multiparty Computation is that it is restricted
to securing the process. There is no analysis of what the results themselves might
reveal. This is an important problem which needs to be solved for any practical
application of the techniques developed. Also, most of the solutions developed are
valid within the semi-honest model of computation. Some go beyond that, but none
are suitable for completely malicious behavior. It would be interesting to see how to
extend our techniques to the malicious model without giving up on eciency.131
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A DISCUSSION OF SECURE MULTIPARTY COMPUTATION TECHNIQUES
We rst discuss some of the other primitives used from the SMC literature. We
then present a complete solution and analysis using the General Secure Multiparty
approach to a single problem to serve as a reference point for comparison.
A.1 Primitive Used from the Literature
The methods in Chapter 3 made use of several previously developed primitives.
For completeness, they are described here.
A.1.1 Permutation Algorithm
The secure permutation algorithm developed by Du and Atallah simultaneously
computes a vector sum and permutes the order of the elements in the vector. We
repeat the idea here for completeness, for more details see [27]. We do present a
more formal proof of the security of the algorithm than that in [27].
The permutation problem is an asymmetric two party algorithm, formally dened
as follows. There exist 2 parties, A and B. B has an n-dimensional vector ~ X =
(x1;:::;xn), and A has an n-dimensional vector ~ V = (v1;:::;vn). A also has a
permutation  of the n numbers. The goal is to give B the result ( ~ X + ~ V ), without
disclosing anything else. In particular, neither A nor B can learn the other's vector,
and B does not learn . For our purposes, ~ V is a vector of random numbers from a
uniform random distribution, used to hide the permutation of the other vector.
The solution makes use of a tool known as Homomorphic Encryption. For a
detailed discussion, see Section 4.4.2. The key is that homomorphic encryption
allows us to perform addition of encrypted data without decrypting it.140
The permutation algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. B generates a public-private keypair (Ek;Dk) for a homomorphic encryption
scheme.
2. B encrypts its vector ~ X to generate the encrypted vector ~ X0 = (x0
1;:::;x0
n);x0
i =
Ek(xi).
3. B sends ~ X0 and the public key Ek to A.
4. A encrypts its vector ~ V generating the encrypted vector ~ V 0 = (v0
1;:::;v0
n);v0
i =
Ek(vi).
5. A multiplies the components of the vectors ~ X0 and ~ V 0 to get ~ T 0 = (t0
1;:::;t0
n),
t0
i = x0
i  v0
i.
Due to the homomorphic property of the encryption,
x
0
i  v
0
i = Ek(xi)  Ek(vi) = Ek(xi + vi)
so ~ T 0 = (t0
1;:::;t0
n);t0
i = Ek(xi + vi).
6. A applies the permutation  to the vector ~ T 0 to get ~ T 0
p = (~ T 0), and sends ~ T 0
p
to B.
7. B decrypts the components of ~ T 0
p giving the nal result ~ Tp = (tp1;:::;tpn);tpi =
xpi + vpi.
Security Analysis
The permutation algorithm reveals nothing to A, so A's view must be simulated
using only it's own input. B gets the result vector.
Theorem A.1.1 The Permutation Algorithm (Section A.1.1) privately computes a
permuted vector sum of two vectors, where one party knows the permutation  and
the other gets permuted sum ( ~ X + ~ V ).141
Proof.
A0s view:
A receives an encryption key Ek and a encrypted vector ~ X0 of size n. It can simulate
the encryption key by generating a single random number from a uniform random
distribution. Assuming security of encryption and since A knows the n, the vector ~ X0
can also be simulated simply by generating n randoms from an uniform distribution.
Using its own vector ~ V and the simulated input, the simulator for A can perform
steps 4{6 to complete the simulation of A's view.
B0s view:
The simulator for B performs steps 1 and 2 to generate Ek and ~ X0. In step 6 B
receives a size n vector ~ T 0
p. To simulate ~ T 0
p, B encrypts the components of the result
Tp = ( ~ X + ~ V ): t0
pi = Ek(tpi).
The simulator for both runs in time linear in the size of the input vectors, meeting
the requirement for a polynomial-time simulation.
A.1.2 Scalar Product Protocol
One of the key sub-protocols required is a protocol for computing the scalar
product of two vectors. Many scalar product protocols have been proposed in the
past [27,46,89]. We now briey describe one of the scalar product protocols given
in [27]. The problem is dened as follows: Alice has a n-dimensional vector ~ X while
Bob has a n-dimensional vector ~ Y . At the end of the protocol, Alice should get
ra = ~ X  ~ Y + rb where rb is a random number chosen from an uniform distribu-
tion and is known only to Bob. The key idea behind the protocol is as follows:
Alice splits up its vector into multiple parts. She then hides each part with some
other random vectors and sends them to Bob. Bob computes the scalar product of
his vector with all the vectors he receives while adding a random he generates to
the result. Alice then uses Oblivious Transfer to get back the correct part results
from all the numbers that Bob has generated. The Oblivious Transfer primitive142
is described in the following subsection. First, here is the actual scalar product
protocol:
Alice and Bob agree on two numbers p and m, such that pm is considered large
enough (for security).
Alice generates m random vectors ~ V1;:::; ~ Vm such that ~ X =
Pm
i=1 ~ Vi.
Bob generates m random numbers r1;:::;rm such that rb =
Pm
i=1 rj.
for j = 1:::m do
Alice generates a secret random number k;1  k  p.
Alice sends ( ~ H1;:::; ~ Hp) to Bob, where ~ Hk = ~ Vj, and the rest of ~ Hi
0
s are random
vectors. Since k is secret, Bob does not know the position of ~ Vj.
for i = 1:::p do
Bob computes Zj;i = ~ Hi  ~ Y + rj.
end for
Using the 1-out-of-p Oblivious Transfer protocol, Alice get Zj = Zj;k = ~ Vj~ Y +rj,
while Bob learns nothing about k
end for
Alice computes ra =
Pm
j=1 Zj = ~ X  ~ Y + rb
The key primitive used in this protocol is the 1-out-of-p Oblivious Transfer.
1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer
The 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer protocol involves two parties, Alice and Bob.
Alice has an input ;1    N, while Bob has N inputs X1;:::;Xn. At the end of
the protocol, Alice learns only X and nothing else while Bob learns nothing at all.
The 1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT 2
1) was suggested by Even, Goldreich and Lem-
pel [31] as a generalization of Rabin's \oblivious transfer" [77]. Naor and Pinkas [67]
provide ecient protocols for 1-out-of-N Oblivious Transfer. For completeness, we
now describe a very simple (though inecient) method for doing Oblivious Transfer.
Bob generates N public key pairs E1;D1;:::;EN;DN143
Bob sends E1;:::;EN to Alice.
Alice generates an asymmetric key K.
Alice forms the vector ~ V : if i = , Vi = Ei(K), otherwise Vi = (a random) Rj.
Alice sends the N-dimensional vector ~ V to Bob
Bob decrypts ~ V to form the vector ~ K where Ki = Di(Vi)
Bob encrypts his data items with the keys in ~ K ands sends them to Alice (i.e.
Bob sends Ki(Xi);i = 1:::N to Alice)
Since K = D(E(K)) = K, Alice decrypts the  row with K to get X
Clearly this protocol reveals nothing to Bob. In the semi-honest model, as long
as Alice acts exactly according to the protocol, she too does not learn anything since
all the other values are encrypted with random keys unknown to her. Though it is
easy to break this protocol when parties are allowed to be malicious, better protocols
(more secure and ecient) can easily be found in the literature.
A.1.3 Square Computation
The problem is dened as follows: There exist two sites, A and B. A holds
xa, while B holds xb. Together they wish to compute shares of the function f =
(xa +xb)2. Thus, at the end of the protocol, A should have ya and B should have yb
such that ya+yb = (xa+xb)2. An obvious way to do this is using oblivious evaluation
of polynomials. A rst generates a random value ya. A then forms the polynomial
P(z) = (1)z2 + (2xa)z + (x2
a   ya). An oblivious evaluation of P(xb) by B gives B,
yb = P(xb). Note that yb + ya = x2
b + 2xaxb + x2
a   ya + ya = (xa + xb)2 as required.
Oblivious Evaluation of Polynomials
Alice has a polynomial P of degree k over some nite eld F. Bob has an el-
ement x 2 F and also knows k. Alice would like to let Bob compute the value
P(x) in such a way that Alice does not learn x and Bob does not gain any ad-
ditional information about P (except P(x)). This problem was rst investigated144
by [66]. Subsequently, there have been more protocols improving the communica-
tion/computation eciency [24] as well as extending the problem to oating point
numbers [19]. For our protocols, we use the protocol given in [24] since it requires
only O(k) exponentiations to evaluate a polynomial of degree k (where the con-
stant is very small). This works well since we only require evaluation of low-degree
polynomials.
We now briey describe the protocol used for oblivious polynomial evaluation.
This description is excerpted from [59]: Let P(y) =
Pk
i=0 aiyi be Alice's input and
x be Bob's input. The following protocol enables Bob to compute gP(x), where g
is a generator of a group in which the Decisional Die-Hellman (DDH) assumption
holds. The protocol can be converted to one computing P(x) using the methods of
Paillier [73], who presented a trapdoor for computing discrete logs. The protocol is
quite simple when the parties are assumed to be semi-honest. Bit-commitment and
zero knowledge proofs can be used to achieve security against malicious parties. The
protocol consists of the following steps:
Bob chooses a secret key s, and sends gs to Alice.
for i = 0:::k do
Bob generates a random ri.
Bob computes ci = (gri;gsrigxi).
end for
Bob sends c0;:::;ck to Alice.
Alice computes C =
Qk
i=0 (ci)ai = (gR;gsRgP(x)), where R =
Pk
i=0 riai.
Alice chooses a random value r and computes C0 = (gRgr;gsRgP(x)gsr).
Alice sends C0 to Bob.
Bob divides the second element of C0 by the rst element of C0 raised to the power
of s, and obtains gP(x).
By the DDH assumption, Alice learns nothing of xi from the messages c0;:::;ck
sent by Bob to her. On the other hand, Bob learns nothing of P from C0.145
A.1.4 Privately Computing lnx
In Section 3.4.4, we need to be able to privately compute lnx, where x = x1 +x2
with x1 known to P1 and x2 known to P2. Thus, P1 should get y1 and P2 should get
y2 such that y1 + y2 = lnx = ln(x1 + x2). One of the key results presented in [59]
was a cryptographic protocol for this computation. We now describe the protocol in
brief: Note that lnx is Real while cryptography works over nite elds. Thus there
needs to be some way of doing numerical analysis. The basic idea behind computing
random shares of ln(x1 +x2) is to use the Taylor approximation for lnx. Remember
that the Taylor approximation gives us:
ln(1 + )
=
1 X
i=1
( 1)i 1i
i
=   
2
2
+
3
3
 
4
4
+ :::for   1 <  < 1
For an input x, let n = blog2 xc. Then 2n represents the closest power of 2 to x.
Therefore, x = x1 + x2 = 2n(1 + ) where  1=2    1=2. Consequently,
ln(x) = ln(2
n(1 + ))
= ln2
n + ln(1 + )
 ln2
n +
X
i=1:::k
( 1)
i 1
i=i
= ln2
n + T()
where T() is a polynomial of degree k. This error is exponentially small in k.
There are two phases to the protocol. Phase 1 nds an appropriate n and . Let
N be a predetermined (public) upper-bound on the value of n. First, Yao's circuit
evaluation is applied to the following small circuit that takes x1 and x2 as input and
outputs random shares of 2N and 2Nnln2. Note that 2n = x   2n, where n can
be determined by simply looking at the two most signicant bits of x and 2N is
obtained simply by shifting the result by N   n bits to the left. Thus the circuit
outputs random 1 and 2 such that 1 + 2 = 2N, and also outputs random 1146
and 2 such that 1+2 = 2Nnln2. This circuit can be easily constructed. Random
shares are obtained by having one of the parties input random values 1;1 2R F
into the circuit and having the circuit output 2 = 2N   1 and 2 = 2Nnln2   1
to the other party.
Phase 2 of the protocol involves computing shares of the Taylor series approxi-
mation, T(). This is done as follows: P1 chooses a random w1 2 F and denes a
polynomial Q(x) such that w1 + Q(2) = T(). Thus Q(_ ) is dened as
Q(x) = lcm(2;:::;k)
k X
i=1
( 1)i 1
2N(i 1)
(1 + x)i
i
  w1
P1 and P2 then execute an oblivious polynomial evaluation with P1 inputting Q()
and P2 inputting 2, where P2 obtains w2 = Q(2). P1 and P2 dene u1 =
lcm(2;:::;k)1 + w1 and u2 = lcm(2;:::;k)2 + w2. We have that u1 + u2 
2Nlcm(2;:::;k)lnx
Further detail on the protocol as well as the proof of security can be found in [60].
Theorem A.1.1 Protocol A.1.4 privately computes lnx, for x = x1 + x2 split be-
tween two parties.
Proof. Refer to [60].
A.1.5 Division Protocol
The problem of division is described as follows: Alice has inputs a1;a2. Bob has
inputs b2;b2. At the end of the protocol, Alice and Bob get shares of (a1+b1)=(a2+b2).
Thus Alice should get ca while Bob gets cb such that:
ca + cb =
a1 + b1
a2 + b2147
We present an ecient protocol to do this based on the Division Protocol developed
in [27].
Alice chooses 3 randoms ca;r1;r2.
Alice forms Bob forms
~ U =
2
6
6 6
6
6
4
r1(a1   ca  a2)
r1
 r1  ca
3
7
7 7
7
7
5
~ V =
2
6
6 6
6
6
4
1
b1
b2
3
7
7 7
7
7
5
Alice and Bob engage in a secure scalar product so that (only) Bob gets
x1 = ~ U  ~ V
= r1(a1   ca  a2) + r1  b1   r1  ca  b2
= r1(a1 + b1   ca(a2 + b2))
Alice forms Bob forms
~ W =
2
6
4
r2  a2
r2
3
7
5 ~ X =
2
6
4
1
b2
3
7
5
Alice and Bob engage in a secure scalar product so that (only) Bob gets
x2 = ~ W  ~ X
= r2a2 + r2b2
= r2(a2 + b2)
Alice sends x3 = r2
r1 to Bob
Bob computes
cb = x1
x2  x3
=
a1+b1 ca(a2+b2)
a2+b2
= a1+b1
a2+b2   ca
Though neither this protocol nor the underlying division protocol have been
formally proven secure, it is also possible to do division in a provably secure fashion
using the generic circuit evaluation method.148
A.2 A Complete Solution and Analysis using the General Secure Multiparty Ap-
proach
This dissertation is predicated on the impracticality of generic circuit evaluation
for solving problems involving large datasets. To demonstrate this, we present a
construction of the size of set intersection as a comparison with the ecient solutions
in Chapter 4.
For demonstration, we limit the problem to 2 parties. We also assume that the
input set sizes can be at most n and that all numbers are m bit. A simple circuit
to do this would compare each value of one set in succession with all of the values
of the other set. The comparator returns 1 if the values are equal, 0 otherwise.
Assuming that we are looking at sets (i.e. objects cannot be repeated), at most one
of the comparators can return 1. Thus, we need n2 comparator circuits. We also
need a layer of addition circuits to add up all the outputs of the comparators. The
result of the nal addition circuit gives the total number of items that are common
to both of the input sets. Thus we need a total of n2 comparators and n2 adders.
The comparators operate over m bit numbers while the adders have to operate over
log2 n bit numbers. In terms of depth, the complete circuit has log2n + 1 layers
(one for each of the addition layers and one for the comparators). It is possible
to actually determine the number of AND gates required for a single adder and a
single comparator. That number gives the number of Oblivious Transfers required
to compute the circuit. In general, while polynomial in the size of the circuit, this is
extremely inecient and thus infeasible.149
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